Military-islamists Relations in the Middle East and North Africa: Confrontations and Containment by Mneimneh, Suzane Abdulaziz
MILITARY-ISLAMISTS RELATIONS IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: 






Bachelor of Arts 





Submitted to the Faculty of the 
Graduate College of 
Oklahoma State University 
in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for 
the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS 
May 2005
MILITARY-ISLAMISTS RELATIONS IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: 









   Joel Jenswold 
   Thesis Adviser 
   David Nixon 
 
   Bob Darcy 
 
   A. Gordon Emslie 





Are Islamists willing to accept a modern state system, secular political order, 
modernization, and democracy in order to establish non-violent relations with the military? 
Armed forces and political Islam are in constant confrontations in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) countries especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Islamists in the MENA region have been steadily moving towards acceptance of the 
mentioned concepts. In fact, many Islamists (individuals and parties) succeeded in 
entering the political order in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Kuwait and many other countries. 
In doing so, some demonstrated a willingness to work within the system and with various 
political forces especially with the military in pursuit of common goals, like regime 
liberalization. Others used democracy only as means to reach power and threaten modern 
state system; thus, invoked military interference in politics to prevent them from reaching 
power. 
 
The participation of self-identified islamically oriented groups in elections and in 
modern political processes in general aroused considerable controversies. Armed forces, 
who believe in secularism and separation of religion and politics, perceive Islamist 
groups as threats to their values. The Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) participation 
in 1991-1992 elections provides a good example. The FIS campaigned for building an 
Islamic state and rejecting all Western principles such as democracy, secularism, and 
modernity while participating in elections to reach power. Consequently, the military 
intervened and canceled elections. 
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 On the other hand, the current leadership in Turkey, Justice and Development 
Party (AKP), though it comes from Islamic origins, was able to succeed in 2002 elections 
and stay in power ever since with out military interference. They campaigned for freedom 
and democracy and promoted them as important dimensions of an Islamic society. 
 
This controversy leads to asking how can Islamists reach power and stay in power 
under without military interface. The answer to this question lays in the Islamist 
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Introduction: Military & Islamists' in Contemporary MENA Politics 
Many authors, such as Huntington, consider military in both developed and developing 
countries as one of the most powerful institutions that have significant effect on internal and 
external security policies. Generally, civil-military relation is defined as "the relationship 
between the armed forces of the state and the larger society they serve—how they communicate, 
how they interact, and how the interface between them is ordered and regulated" (Hooker JR. 
Winter 2003-04).  
 
However, the extents of military functions and effects differ between developed and 
developing countries. In developed states, the constitution and political norms clearly define 
military's role and functions in relation to state and society. Nonetheless, politicians still believe 
the military tends to challenge civilian authorities (Pfaff 2002). 
 
 In the case of developing countries, the military role and functions are complex and 
problematic in relation to state and society. The military has greater influence and decisive role 
not only in the field of national security policy formulation but also in internal security policy 
(Rubin 2002, 1-21). 
 
Therefore, it is important to assess the role of militaries and their relations to state and 
society in developing countries of MENA based on the theoretical framework laid down by 
western scholars, such as Huntington, on civil-military relations.  
The focus will be to determine the military's role in the domestic sphere that includes the 
government and society and then to find the area of interaction between Islamists, military and 
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state. The dynamics of establishing an Islamist government in secular states guarded by military 
officers cannot be understood well without comprehending the role of Islamist and military 
institutions at the domestic level. Their interaction in a political framework has direct effects on a 
country’s future especially when the former attempts to rule. 
  
 Samuel Huntington's classic book, The Soldier and the State, discusses the implications of 
civil-military relations upon national security affairs. He argues that in a democracy, those who 
govern have power by virtue of legal and democratic elections. However, the military, although 
not similarly elected, also holds power. Consequently, successful and non-violent civil-military 
relations are crucial to those seeking to create stable government that reflects people's will. The 
key issue remains how a democratically elected government can be safe from military 
intervention and exert control over the military, rather than the other way around. This is 
specifically important since many MENA countries witnessed several coup d'état. In such cases, 
the military formed the government, such as the cases of Egypt and Libya, or directly ruled the 
country such as the case of Yemen, Sudan, and Turkey 1980-1983 (Rubin 2002, 1-16). In other 
cases, the military was considered guardian or supporter of the civilian government such as the 
cases of Jordan and the Gulf Arab monarchies (Rubin 2002, 1-16). 
 
Since late nineteenth century, Islamists searched for a solution to the political, cultural, 
and religious crisis caused by Western, specifically European, imperialism and the post-
independence modernization and secularization attempts. Islamists believed that the secularists' 
ruling elite and officer corps were responsible for the deteriorating moral and religious status of 
Muslim communities. They called for the rejection of the Western ideologies and values, non co-
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operation with the new secular rulers, and holy war 'jihad' against them and the secular state 
system (Rubin 2002, Owen 2004, Weitzman & Inbar 1997). Secular rulers saw Islamists as a 
threat to modern state and political order. In this sense, the Military was used by many MENA 
governments (in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq) to advocate the separation of religion from the state in 
the context of the Western model of state and the constraint of the influence of Islam in state and 
society. Armed forces also tended to suppress Islamists, sometimes by violent means, to prevent 
them from defying the modern state system and from achieving their goals.  Therefore, the 
officer corps, as the regime guardians, banded, jailed, and executed many Islamists. 
 
When the difficulty to overcome military repression by violence became better 
understood, Islamists began to come up with strategies that are more creative and methods, 
which best utilize the available political opportunities.  Many Islamist movements such as the 
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria worked within the state system and participated in 
democratic elections.  Nevertheless, they still tried to change state and society towards rejecting 
secularism and adopting Islamic constitution.  They ended up overthrown from government by 
military coup in 1992.  Other Islamists, such as the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
worked within the system with out posing any threat to the state or ruling elite.  They managed to 
stay in government until present day. 
 
Military- Islamists relations focus on several dynamics. These dynamics include the 
military function as the state guardian, military intervention, and influence in state and society, 
military participation in politics, and societal impacts on militaries.  This leads us to the question 
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this paper is trying to answer: How can Islamists establish non-violent relations with the military 
in order to reach power without military intervention or coup d'état to interrupt their success? 
 
 The hypothesis examined in this research is, Islamists could reach power, form or 
participate in governments and parliaments, and stay in power by making some sacrifices 
concerning their Islamist orientation. Islamist must compromise if they want to establish non-
violent relations with military to secure their success in elections. To do that, they must not 
constitute any threat to the values protected by the military. 
  
To test this hypothesis, comparative analysis, through focusing on military-Islamists 
relation in two states (Turkey and Algeria) has been used to examine the effects of the military 
ideology and its perception of its role in state and society on Islamists prospects of reaching 
power and ruling. Analysis is based on comparing the case of the AKP and its success in wining 
2002 election, forming government, and staying in power until present day with the case of the 
FIS frailer in reaching power though it succeeded in the first round of 1991-1992 election. The 
aim of this comparison is to find out the conditions under which non-violent relations could be 
established between military and Islamists. 
 
The purpose of this research is to look at the varying factors that conditioned the 
relationship between Islamists and armed forces in Turkey and Algeria. As with any dynamic 




The purpose of this research, however, goes beyond merely reporting on particular 
situations where the military intervened in politics and prevented or allowed Islamists to reach 
power. Instead, this research offers an analysis of the effects the military role in MENA societies 
have on its interaction with Islamists and the effects of Islamists ambitions and ideology on this 
interactions and on the prospects of their integration in the political order.     
 
Military-Islamists relation here means the ongoing negotiation for power in which the 
military and Islamist groups compete, sometimes violently and occasionally peacefully, for 
control of politics (Rubin 2002, Schulze 2000). The way to measure non-violent military-Islamist 
relation is by assessing the Islamists' attitudes and views towards the values that the military is 
guarding. Thus, threatening them might produce a violent relation with the military and vise-
versa might lead to non-violent military-Islamists relation.   
 
Military-Islamists relation can be studied from a variety of approaches. However, this 
research focuses on Huntington's theoretical framework on civil-military relations. Huntington 
assumes that his framework could apply on all societies (Huntington 1957, viii). Unfortunately, 
his theoretical framework is based on analyzing western history that might not fit perfectly the 
historical conditions of the MENA region.  
 
A difficult way to consider military-Islamists relations is to compare them across the 
types of political systems in which they exist. Yet, by analyzing and comparing the cases of 
Algeria and Turkey, the likely finding is that non-violent relations could be established if 
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Islamists did not pose any threat to the values the military is guarding. This way, Islamists could 
reach power and govern without fearing military coups. 
 
This paper is divided into five chapters. The first chapter, introduction, summarizes the 
discussion of this research and specifies the problem, research question and hypothesis, 
methodology, and the purpose of this study.  
 
The second chapter discusses research design and methods with detailed explanation of 
the comparative analysis used in this paper and the sources of data. It also discusses the variables 
that are civil-military relations (independent variable) and military-Islamists relations (dependent 
variable). Furthermore, to understand clearly the dependent variable, this chapter illustrated the 
meaning of Islamism/Islamists.  
 
The Third chapter (Military-Islamists Relations: Theoretical Framework), examines 
Huntington's civil-military relations theory specifically military's relations to state, society, and 
democracy. In the same time, it demonstrates empirical implementation of his theory of the 
MENA region. Furthermore, this chapter examines Islamists-civil relation specifically Islamists' 
attitudes and views towards state, society, and democracy. At the end, this chapter articulates a 
theoretical framework for military-Islamists relations. 
 
The forth chapter presents the two case studies Turkey and Algeria. Both case, 
demonstrate military interaction with state, society, democracy, and Islamists. Finally, chapter 
five discusses the findings and conclusions deduced from comparing the two cases. 
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Chapter 2 
Methodology, Research Design, and Analytic Framework   
Comparative research methods have long been used in cross-cultural studies to identify, 
analyze, and explain similarities and differences across societies. Whatever the methods used, 
research that crosses national boundaries increasingly takes account of socio-cultural settings. 
This is an important factor in this research since one of the aims is to examine the effects of the 
military ideology and its perception of it role on state and society especially that most of the 
literature written on civil-military relation is based on western experience. Thus, incorporating 
comparative research methods is important to find out how the of civil-military theories could 
explain civil-military relations in developing countries, such as those in MENA region, on the 
one hand, and examine military-Islamists relations in the region, on the other hand. It is also 
important because although Turkey and Algeria are countries in the MENA; yet, their historical, 
economic, social, and political development affected their militaries and societies differently.  
 
This paper is based on examining the military-Islamists relations in two situations: the first 
is the success of the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) in reaching power and ruling 
by wining Turkey's 2002 elections. The second situation represents the failure of the Algerian 
Islamic Salvation front (FIS) in reaching power and ruling though they won the first round of 
elections in 1991. Both countries are famous for military intervention in politics. In the first case, 
although military coup overthrew the most recent government headed by an Islamist party, the 
Welfare Part, in 1997, they did not intervene when the AKP formed a majority government 
headed by it leader Recipe Tayeb Erdogan. In the second case, military, who ruled the country 
through the National Liberation Front (FLN), canceled the electoral process in 1992, annulled 
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the elections results, and banned the FIS. Comparing the two cases will facilitate finding out the 
conditions under which the military-Islamists relations could be non-violent.  
 
In this study, the data are collected from two different sources: Arabic sources, mainly 
Abdul Hameed Braheemy's book "The Origins of the Algerian Crisis: 1958-1999" (2001) which 
provides a thorough analysis of the foundations of the Islamists involvement in Algerian politics 
and M. Hakan Yavuz book "Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Religion and Global Politic". 
Other Arabic sources are the books of Ishmael Al- Shatty, Majdy Hammad, and Hydar Abraham 
Ali who discussed the issue of the role Islamists might play in the political system. In addition, 
statistics are taken from Aljazeera network as well as other Arabic newspapers and networks. 
The other sources of data are chosen from western literature specifically the work of Samuel 
Huntington "The Soldier and the State" in which he articulated the civil-military theory. In 
addition, there is the work of Barry Rubin "Armed Forces in the Middle East" through which he 
tried to apply the civil-military theories to the Middle East. Data were collected from western 
more than MENA literature.  
 
Variables' Conceptualization 
 Since the focus of this paper is to examine the prospects of non-violent military- Islamists 
relations, the independent variable is civil-military relations and the dependent variable is non-
violent military-Islamists relations. The dependent variable is measured by the Islamists 
acceptance of the modern form of state, principles of democracy, modernization, and secularism, 
and the engagement in peaceful competition and participation in the political system. Such 
elements represent the core of military values in most of the MENA countries. 
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Nation-state, democracy, and modernization constitute the main pillars of the 
contemporary epoch. This epoch witnessed the rise of pluralism and the spread of civil rights 
movements. Protecting human rights became the focal point of the international and regional 
institutions activities. These international values governed stats' development and relations. 
However, states who do not abide by such values are contained. For example, such states do not 
receive economic and technological aid and sometimes they suffer from economic sanctions. 
Many political regimes claim to be democratic and supportive of modernization, though they 
may not be, because this is their pathway to the modern world. In this sense, states or political 
movement could not explicitly reveal rejection towards democratic principles and modernization 
attempts (Ali 1999, 20).  
  
 From this perspective, the attitude towards democracy specifies how modernized is any 
ideology, movement, or political regime and the opposites also true. Today, an underdeveloped 
or regressive regime, ideology, or political movement could be measured by the extent to which 
it is remote from democracy and modernity (Ali 1999, 20).  
 
This assumption constitutes an essential element in explaining the way Islamists react to 
nation-states, political order, modernity, and democracy. This is due to the fact that the pillars of 
the new epoch (democracy, nation-state and modernity) as concepts, institutions, ideologies, way 
of life and modern age philosophy occupied Islamists thoughts and influenced their activities 
towards state and society ever since the establishment of Islamism. Islamists always theorized 
about the methods of reacting to these pillars, violently or peacefully, or even about the ways, 
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they could adapt to modern world conditions. Their aim was always to fit in the new state system 
or transform this system to fit their aims (Ali 1999, 20).   
 
In this sense, specifying Islamists attitude towards democracy, modern state system, and 
modernity is an important condition to find out the nature of the relationship between the 
military and Islamists in the MENA region. However, it is important to define the variables of 
this relation before examining it. 
 
Civil-Military relation: Conceptual and empirical challenges  
It has often been noted that military's distinctiveness in society is due to its responsibility 
in the management of violence. Harold Lasswell describes the military as a body composed of 
men skilled in the "management of violence" (Huntington 1957, 11). Yet, in most countries, 
many other groups are permitted to keep weapons such as militant wings of political parties in 
the Meddle East. Thus, the difference between military and such militant groups lies in their 
organization and training rather than in managing violence. In fact, Morris Janowitz argues that 
militaries are official bureaucracies legitimized by the national state (Janowitz 1977, 15). 
Furthermore, the military is not similar to any other social group. Members of the military are 
different from a doctor or a lawyer; they are taking on a whole way of life. Military has its own 
industries, schools, academies, courts, codes and so on and so forth.  
 
Huntington believes that these characteristics constitute the essence of military 
professionalism. To understand what is meant by professionalism, he argues, "A profession is a 
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peculiar type of functional group with highly specialized characteristics." Those characteristics 
are expertise, responsibility, and corporateness (Huntington 1957, 7-10). 
For Huntington then, professionalism is what distinguishes modern militaries from ancient 
warriors.  
He argues that, 
"Modern officer corps is highly professional body. It has its own expertise, 
corporateness, and responsibility. The existence of this profession tends to 
imply, and the practice of the profession tends to engender among its 
members, a distinctive outlook on international politics, the role of the state, 
the place of violence in human affairs, the nature of man and society, and 
the relationship of the military profession with the state"  (Huntington 1977, 
6) 
 
  Professionalism is frequently reflected in the ways military views society and state. In 
other words, officer corpses are conscious that they are different from politicians as well as 
civilians. 
 
Civil-military relation then reflects military interaction with state and society. 
Generally, it is defined as "the relationship between the armed forces of the state and the larger 
society they serve—how they communicate, how they interact, and how the interface between 
them is ordered and regulated" (Hooker JR. Winter 2003-04).  
For Huntington, 
 "The principle focus of civil-military relations is the relations of officer 
corps to the state. The officer corps is the active directing element of the 
military structure and is responsible for the military security of society. The 
state is the active directing element of society and is responsible for the 
allocation of resources among important values including military security. 
The social and economic relations between the military and the rest of 
society normally reflect the political relations between the officer corps and 
the state" (1957, 3)     
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From this perspective, the civil-military framework involves two dimensions: first, the 
civilian control of military; and second the role of military as a professional institution in society. 
Civil-military relation, in democratic, developed countries is mainly expressed in terms of 
civilian control over military institution (Finer 1962, 14). In these states, civil control of the 
military means the control by elected civilians. In other words, “civilian control means simply 
the degree to which the military’s civilian masters can enforce their authority on the military 
services" (Hooker JR. Winter 2003-04). This dimension places the military within the frame of 
civil society. The history of western civil-military relations shows that civilian control helps in 
developing the military or as Huntington calls it "military professionalism" (Huntington 1957, 7-
18).  
 
In this sense, civilian control of the military enhances its professionalism. It guarantees 
that protecting the state and society's national security does not threaten the basic democratic 
principles such as majority rule, minority rights, and political rights and liberties. Decision-
making process and its outcomes is the responsibility of civilian political leaders while the 
responsibility of the military is to obey the orders of civilian authorities and to implement their 
decisions (Huntington 1957, 7-18). Building on this notion of professionalism, Huntington 
argues that the military is more efficient as an "expert advisor" on security matters and therefore 
military officers are most effectual when they are completely neutral politically. He states, 
"Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in 
politics undermines their professionalism" (Huntington 1957, 71).  
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However, S.E. Finer argues that militaries engage in politics mostly to maintain their 
organizational ideology or interests (1962, 32-60). According to Finer, the motivations of 
military intervention depend on two aspects: disposition and opportunity. He explains disposition 
as the incentive to intervene which results from a combination of motives and mood. Military 
motives are one or a combination of the following:  
1) "Manifest destiny of the soldiers"  
2) National interest 
 3) Sectional interest, such as class, regional, communal, or individual self-interest 
4) A combination of the above motives. 
 Finer explains the mood to intervene as a complex feature that can be provoked by two elements: 
a "sense of overwhelming power" or "high self-esteem". 
Concerning military's opportunity to intervene in politics, Finer argues that it depends on two 
aspects:  
1) An increased civilian reliance on the military or the effect of the security environment 
2) The popularity of the military (Finer 1962, 28-73) 
 
Morris Janowitz also argues that professional military cannot escape being politicized 
because to be effective it must be skilled in managing violence as well as skilled in dealing with 
security issues and the ambiguous politico-military nature of the security environment within the 
civil context (Sarkesian 1984, 156) 
 
The second dimension of civil-military framework in developed countries is military's 
role in state and society. The military in developed and democratic countries is considered an 
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interest group, which gets involved in domestic and foreign decision-making (Bienen 1971, 1). 
In fact, Huntington argues that in modern, developed societies, which are "characterized by 
relatively high institutionalized political structure and patterns of rule", the military is 
characterized by "relatively high institutionalized and professionalized officer corps" 
(Huntington 1977, 6) 
 
In a developed democracy, the military exists to protect the national security of state and 
society. Huntington divided the concept of national security into three levels: 
1. External security, which represents threats coming from other states or actors 
exterior to the nation's political and social institutions 
2. Internal security, which represents threats coming from within the state aiming at 
destroying or weakening the political order 
3. Situational security, which reflects threats that result from long-term social, 
political, and economic decay of the state (Huntington 1957, 1) 
 
The military function is to protect national security according to the people will, which is 
expressed through their legal representatives. The military does not represent or support any 
political viewpoint or ethnic and social group. It is subordinate to the legally elected government. 
From this perspective, the military devotes all its capabilities to the nation, to the rule of law, and 
to the principle of democracy (Huntington 1957, 7-18).  
In this sense, civil-military relations in democratic, developed countries involve devotion 
to the principles of democracy, modernity, and nation-state. The military is barred from 
involving in politics and placed under civilian control. 
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Based on this framework, civil-military relation is understood as a duality. First is the 
power concerns; military must be subordinate to democratically elected civilians. Civilians are 
responsible for making decision in all areas of state policy, including national security and 
defense policy. Second is the issue of professionalism in the roles, organization, and missions 
assigned to the military. Armed forces must not be bias to any political institution, group, or 
ideology. 
  
However, the civil-military relation framework in developed countries differs from that in 
developing countries, or Third World nations. In developed countries, it is commonly assumed, 
as previously noticed, that it is natural for the military establishment to be subordinate to civil 
control and to obey politicians. However, in the MENA, this is far from being the normal pattern 
of events. Since 1945, for instance, more than three quarters of the countries of MENA have 
experienced varying levels of military intervention. Some states such as Turkey, Syria, and 
Pakistan have been repeatedly hosts to a coup d'état (Rubin 2002, 1-16). 
 
Thus, civil-military framework involves two different dimensions than the ones 
previously mentioned. The first dimension relates to "military interventions in politics through 
coup d'état" and the second dimension relates to "military rule of the polity once the military 
have seized power and decide to keep it" (Bienen 1971, 1-28 & Huntington 1977, 6). 
 
To elaborate, in many MENA countries, the military has intervened in the political 
process and sometimes overthrown the constitutional civilian authority. Moreover, in many 
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situations the military, once politicized, declared itself superior to elected politicians, such as the 
case of Turkey's military coup in 1980 (Bienen 1971, 1-28). The Military interference in politics 
refers to the "substantial and purposeful involvement of the armed forces in the making and 
allocation of wealth and of social and political values, including national security" (Watson & 
Danopoulos 1996, XV). Accordingly, analyzing the armed forces intervention in politics is 
primarily linked to the process of modernization in developing countries and the military role as 
a modernizing institution (Bienen 1971, 4). The reason behind this link is that military 
intervention is not isolated from other political institution and processes and social groups. 
Consequently, by studying the relationship between the armed forces, state, and society in the 
context of modernity and development we can "better assess the prospects for the future 
evaluation of the armed forces in society" (Bienen 1971, 4). 
 
MENA countries have a long history of military rule. The military played an important 
role in initiating and carrying out the process of modernization. According to D. Rustow, 
modernization "denotes rapidly widening control over nature through closer cooperation among 
men. It transforms both man and society, but most of all man's mind". This process includes "all 
the more specific changes such as industrialization, rationalization, secularization, and 
bureaucratization" (1967, 3). Rustow saw modernization as a revolutionary process that 
reconstructs the intellectual, technological, and social aspects of any society. Based on this 
understanding of modernization, the military was the only force capable of carrying out such 
processes in the new independent state in MENA (Rubin 2002, 10). Even Huntington agreed on 
the modernizing role of the military in MENA when he stated that "in Turkey, the Young Turks 
in 1908 and the Kemalists in the 1920s played highly progressive reforming roles similar to 
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those which the military after WWII assumed in other Middle Eastern countries" (1968, 219). 
Military, then, was a key political and economic actor in the regimes of a variety of MENA 
countries. It has always enjoyed a special status in state and society because it has seen itself as 
the guardian of secular, reformist, and democratic goals that almost all MENA sought to achieve 
after independence (Rubin 2002, 1-20). 
 
Many of the MENA regimes came into power through coup d'état and policies were set 
by officer corps. For example, after the Arab defeat in war against Israel in 1967, new military-
led regimes were established in "Iraq in 1968 and in Syria in 1970 as well as the succession of 
President Sadat in Egypt in 1970" (Owen 2004, 181). Military junta was due to social disorder 
and political corruption, which undermined civil governments during the period of state-building 
(Rubin 2002, 10).    
 
In this sense, there are two frameworks for civil-military relations. The first could exist in 
developed and democratic societies where civilians are in control. In such societies, military 
officers are professionals. They restrict themselves to democratically accepted boundaries though 
ready to defend their interests against civilian violation. The second framework could exist in 
developing and, to a certain extent, undemocratic societies where political institutions are 
developing and modernizing. Such institutions are characterized of being weak and lacking 
legitimacy. In these societies, the military gradually expand its influence, become politicized, 
and sometimes directly take over the state replacing the civilians. 
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The second framework is more applicable to the case of MENA region because as 
Huntington claims " the more backward a society is, the more progressive the role of its 
military"(Huntington 1968, 221). Specialists of MENA draw on both Huntington and his critics 
when discussing civil-military relations in the region. Barry Rubin demonstrates that military 
involvement in politics is produced from both the internal characteristics of the military 
institution (ideologies and values) and the political environment in which it operates (2002, 1-20). 
The political environment in developing countries is characterized of being "less highly 
institutionalized and differentiated"(Huntington 1977, 6). 
 
Based on this framework, the definition of civil-military relations in MENA region must 
take into consideration not only the initial conditions of military ideology, values, and privileges, 
but also the inclinations of the officer corps. These inclinations are expressed, on the one hand, 
in the attitudes of the corps and its role in democracy, and on the other hand, in the interaction 
between the armed forces and politicians and civilian actors in the security environment. 
 
In this sense and for the purpose of this research civil-military relations are defined, 
according to Samuel P Huntington and Andrew J Goodpaster, as: “… representing a complex set 
of inter-relationships, established norms and practices between the Armed Forces and other 
Social structures" (Huntington & Goodpaster 1977, 31). 
 
Islamism/Islamists: between religion and politics 
In this research, the term ' Islamism' refers, in general, to the political ideology of some 
groups who connect themselves to the religion of Islam; thus, they are labeled as Islamists (Ali 
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1999, 42-53). However, before going any further in defining Islamism it is necessary to 
distinguish between Islam and Islamism.  
 
Islamism is separated in many important ways from the Islamic tradition -the religion of 
Islam (Hammad 2001, 7-14). Due to the circumstances that Islamists were born in, traditional 
Muslim scholars see Islamism as a response and a symptom of modernization and secularization, 
colonialism, and identity crises. Colonial powers enforced political and economic changes as 
well as cultural modifications. Colonialists fought Islamic traditions, values, and practices in the 
territories they occupied (Ali 1999, 42-53). For example, during the French colonialism in 
Algeria, natives were not granted citizenship unless they abandon Islam (Schulze 2000, 85). 
 
Islamism started in the early twentieth century with the establishment of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan Al-Banna and the Islamic Society in Pakistan in 1941. 
Both movements called for re-establishment of the Islamic state and the applications of the 
Islamic law. They worked to spread their teaching through MENA societies by establishing 
branches in many states (Ali 1999, 42-53). Yet, extremism started with Sayyed Qutb1 who was 
an activists Marxian before he converted to radical Islamism. He never acquired knowledge from 
scholars. All of his ideology is the result of his own personal interpretation and understanding of 
manuscripts, which label him in the scholars' standard as a pseudo-scholar. Qutb believed that 
there is no separation between state and religion because God provided us with all the necessary 
rules to regulate our political, economic, social, and religious aspects of life. Thus, authority and 
state are parts of society as a whole. From this perspective, Qutb differentiated between Islamic 
                                                 
1 an early leader of the Brotherhood and the writer of "In the Shade of Quran" which was considered the 
unquestionable constitution of Islamists 
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society and ignorant society. He claimed that the international arena would witness clashes 
between the two societies at the end of which the Islamic society will win due to its ideology and 
beliefs (Ali 1999, 191).    
 
In Islamism, individuals do not recognize any authority, religious or not, apart from 
leaders of their own groups, thus they reject the authorized interpreters of the Islamic law (Ali 
1999, 23-40). To explain this, Muslims in general and Sunni in particular do not see Islam as an 
organization dependent on a centralized religious leadership. Traditional scholars are not 
necessarily the rulers in society. Islamists, on the contrary, see their leading militants as the 
Islamic guidance and the rulers at the same time, thereby eliminating the need to refer to 
traditional scholars for guidance (Ali 1999, 23-40).  
 
In this sense, the Islamists subordinate religion to politics. They carry out their political 
activities, though they are in many cases contrary to the teachings of Islam, and justify them by 
Islam (Ali 1999, 23-40). A clear example is al-Qaedas bombing of the World Trade Center in 
September 11, 2001. Bin Laden claimed he performed his act in the name of Islam, while we 
find that Muslim scholars, like the famous Annawawy, of the 10th century and others alike, 
mention in their widely known literatures that Islamic rules forbid the aggression against non-
Muslims (by Muslims) who enter their territories with their authorities' approval. Bin Laden, 
classifying himself as a scholar, did not follow this traditional teaching; rather, he only followed 
his group's interpretations and views regardless of whether it disagrees or not with the main 
Islamic verdict (Ali 1999, 23-40).  
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Khalid Duran notes the distinction between traditional Islam and its political counterfeit, 
Islamism, by underlining their different understandings of the relationships between religion and 
politics:  
"Whether Islamists like the term fundamentalists or not, their understanding of 
religion resembles the fundamentalists in other religions. This is not to say that 
Islamists are more religious or more genuinely Islamic than other Muslims are . . . 
Islamism is late 20th century totalitarianism. It follows fascism and communism, 
picking up from those and seeking to refine their methods of domination . . . 
"Few Muslims would deny that political commitment is part of Islam ethics, but 
most disagree with the Islamist insistence that there exists a clearly defined 
'Islamic system', different from all other political systems"(Duran 2000, 27-28).  
 
 
Not only does Islamism reject those aspects of the Islamic tradition that do not fit with its 
political outlook and agenda, but it also regards most Muslims to be infidels. Islamists consider 
their groups and militants as the sole guardians of the mission for Islamizing the world. Whoever 
criticizes them (whether a Muslim or a non-Muslim) is immediately accused of being infidel and 
subjected to punishment. That is why in many cases, Islamists wage wars, within their society, 
on fellow Muslims because they abided by the state's laws such as the case of Algeria where 
almost one hundred thousand Algerian (mostly Muslims) were killed since 1992 (Ali 1999, 23-
40). In this sense, the international society as well as many domestic political actors in MENA 
considers Islamism as a dangerous, extremist, and even terrorist ideology.  
  
In the same context, Islamism is separate from fundamentalism. Fundamentalism refers 
to a return to the roots of Islam, to the origins and basics. These roots represent the original 
religious texts, mainly the Quran, Hadith, and the interpretation of the Islamic scholars (Ijtihad). 
Islamism, on the other hand, refers to the political ideology of those groups who adopt their own 
interpretation of Islam, which, in many ways, is not related to the original texts (Ali 1999, 23-40). 
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For example, the previously mentioned Sayyed Qutb published his book "In the Shade of Quran" 
in which he interpreted the context of the Holy Quran without having the necessary religious 
studies and qualifications that an interpreter should have. The qualified interpreter of the Quran 
should have the following characteristics: First, the interpreter should be well educated about the 
Arab language (the language of the Holy Quran), literature, and vocabulary to differentiate 
between synonyms of the same Quranic words. Second, since the Quran contains two types of 
verses, story verses and ruling verses, the interpreter should know the mode of use of ruling 
verses i.e. general or exclusive. He should also know the speeches of the Prophet that were not a 
body text of the Quran, in order to avoid a conflict between the interpretation of those speeches 
and that of Quran.  He must also know the verdicts of Islam that came as a unanimous agreement 
between all scholars in order to avoid the violation of such agreements during his interpretation 
(Lewis 1996, 52-63).      
 
Many Islamists often have fundamentalist beliefs; however, they are not all necessarily 
fundamentalist. Most Islamists believe in traditions that do not have a direct textual basis. They 
mainly follow the instruction of the group leader and believe in his political ideology as if it 
came directly from the Islamic text (Ali 1999, 23-40). 
 
The reason behind explaining the separation between Islam and Islamism is to show that 
the Islamists can adjust their political ideologies according to circumstances. Islamists has 
twisted many principles within Islam that deal with politics, economics, and military affairs into 
a sustained and systematic program. Whereas, Islam is sacred law cannot be adjusted or changed. 
Muslims must follow all its principles and not select whatever suits their surroundings. By 
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remembering that Islam Pluralism is, in principle, compatible with democracy nothing 
necessitate the adjustment of Islam (Ali 1999, 23-40). 
 
An example of Islamists changing their agenda can be seen in the case of Sudan. 
Traditionally a Christian was allowed to drink alcohol while a Muslim is prohibited because 
Islamic law applies only to Muslims. However, the present government has prohibited alcohol 
for every Sudanese (Pipes 1998). On the contrary, in traditional Islam drinking, even 
manufacturing and selling, alcohol is forbidden to all, Muslim or non-Muslim, since the days of 
the prophet and till the end of days.   
 
For the purpose of this study then, Islamism is defined as the political and social doctrine 
that was newly born in Muslim communities due to social and ideological clashes with western 
ideologies and values. Islamism uses Islam as a technique to mobilize the public in accordance to 
its aims (Ali 1999, 23-40).  
 
Moreover, Islamist groups are defined as those politicized groups who employ Islam in 
political speeches or use Islam as a political symbol in order to increase their popular support to 
reach power and induce change in government and society. Islamist groups place their 
revolutionary behavior not principally in a spiritual, but in social and political rejection of the 





Military-Islamists relations: conceptual framework 
In many MENA countries, military was the only efficient and stable institution after 
independence. Thus, military "played an important role in maintaining internal security". In fact, 
the officer corps functioned as the guardian of nation state, secularism, modernization, and 
regime (Rubin 2002, 10-11). Islamists, on the other hand, worked hard to reintroduce Islam to 
society and state. They rejected the modern state system, secularism, and modernity. In some 
cases, such as the assassination of President Sadat in Egypt in 1981 by a member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, Islamist militant used extreme violence to overthrow a secular authoritarian regime 
and establish an Islamic republic.  
 
Due to the clash of interests, there were many confrontations between Islamists and 
armed forces in most MENA countries during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Even after the end of 
the Cold War, the military tackled with Islamists in Turkey, Algeria, and Pakistan (Rubin 2002, 
1-16). The armed forces intervened in politics to preserve the state system and political order 
from Islamists.  
 
From this perspective, in MENA countries where Islamists are pressing for greater part in 
the political system and the military is opposing such ambitions, politics are shaped by the 
dynamic of Islamist-military relations as well as their relation to the state and society. In this 
sense, and for the purpose of this study, military-Islamists relation is defined as the ongoing 
negotiation for power in which the military and Islamist groups compete, sometimes violently 
and occasionally peacefully, for control of politics (Rubin 2002, Schulze 2000).  
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The aim of this study, then, is to find out the conditions under which military-Islamists 
relation could be non-violent. The way to measure non-violent military-Islamist relation, as 
mentioned previously, is by assessing the Islamists' attitudes and views towards nation-state, 
democracy, and modern society. These elements represent the values that the military is 
protecting. Thus, threatening them might produce a violent reaction by the military and vise-
versa might lead to non-violent military-Islamists relation.   
 
Remarks on Data 
Several problems in obtaining relevant data were encountered during the course of this 
research. The first problem is based on the sensitive nature of the project. There were few figures 
and very few generally accepted facts regarding the Algerian Islamist movements and especially 
the FIS. There exists little primary information (i.e. specific actual figures about the size of 
popular participation in the elections in 1991). In addition, due to the rule of an authoritarian 
regime, it is forbidden to give such information by governmental institutions, or to find out the 
real size of the FIS popular base, the number of their active members, or other critical 
information.  
 
The second problem involves author's bias. In writing this study, and due to fact that the 
issues discussed here, especially those relate to Islam and Islamists, are very sensitive issues, 
author bias might be noted. Thus, to control this problem, data is mainly collected from western 
or neutral literature (not from Islamic basis even if it was from Arabic origin) on the issues that 
were considered.  
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The third problem relates to external validity. Since each Islamist group differs from 
others in their environments, it is hard to assume that the factors that assist Islamist groups in 
reaching power in MENA are the same in all countries. The findings of this study are only one 
scenario and not to be generalized. In some MENA countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Bahrain UAE, and Syria, political parties are banned thus, it is hard to gather data about these 
factors. When talking about Islamist groups in these countries we only refer to individuals and 
not officially established parties. In other MENA countries such as Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan, 
Islamist groups are allowed to form political parties and to participate in elections. Some of them 
actually acquired seats in the parliaments. However, those groups are still politically too weak. 




Military-Islamists Relations: Theoretical Framework 
Exploring Huntington's Civil-Military Theory 
  Huntington provided theoretical analysis of the civil-military relations in his book" The 
Soldier and the State". In order to understand the complications of civil-military relations in any 
society he provided two methodological assumptions: 
"First, it is assumed that the civil-military relations in any society 
should be studied as a system composed of independent elements. 
The principal components of such a system are the formal, structural 
position of military institutions in the government; the informal role 
and influence of military groups, in politics and society at large; and 
the nature of the ideologies of military and nonmilitary groups" 
(Huntington 1957, viii). 
 
He claims that based on this assumption there must be an equilibrium between "the authority, 
influence, and ideology of the military, on the one hand, and the authority, influence, and 
ideology of the nonmilitary groups, on the other" (1957,viii). Huntington's second 
methodological assumption claims that: 
"Starting from certain premises concerning the nature and the 
purpose of military institutions, it is possible to define in the abstract 
that particular type of equilibria - "objective civilian control" - which 
maximizes military security. It is possible to analyze the extent to 
which the system of civil-military relations in any society tends to 
enhance or detract from the military security of the society. It is also 
possible to suggest the changes in the component elements of the 
system, which would be necessary if the system, were to 




To elaborate, Huntington argues that civil-military relations constitute an important 
element of national security policy (1957, 1). He claims that the purpose of national security 
policy is "to enhance the safety of the nation's social, economic, and political institutions against 
 27
threats arising from other independent states" (1957, 1). In this sense, he identified three forms 
of this policy. The first pertains to military security policy which is "the program of activities 
designed to minimize or neutralize efforts to weaken or destroy the nation by armed forces 
operating outside its institutional and territorial confines"(1957, 1). The forms of civilian control 
over military affect the state's foreign policy especially in cases of threats. Tension between 
soldiers and political leaders may lead to defeat. Thus, it is important to outline the framework of 
civil-military relations in this area.  
         
The second form of national security policy is situational security policy. This policy "is 
concerned with the threat of erosion resulting from long-term changes in social, economic, 
demographic, and political conditions tending to reduce the relative power of the state" (1957, 1).
       
However, this paper is not interested in military security policy or situational security 
policy; it is more interested in the third form, which is internal security policy. According to 
Huntington, internal security policy deals with "the threat of subversion - the effort to weaken or 
destroy the state by forces operating within its territorial and institutional confines" (1957, 1). 
Such forces could operate from within state system by establishing civil associations and in 
some cases political parties. They might have radical agendas that aim to destroy the existing 
political order and reestablish a new one that suits their goals. This might be the case of many 
Islamist groups in the majority of Muslim countries. Nevertheless, before analyzing Islamist-
military relations in the context of internal security policy it is necessary to understand military's 
relations with state, society, and democracy, on the one hand, and Islamists' relations with state, 
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society, and democracy, on the other, both theoretically and in practice. 
  
Military-State Relations 
         According to Huntington, "the principal forms of civil-military relations is the relation of 
the officer corps to the state" (1957, 3). He considered officer corps as the modern military 
"professional body and the modern military officer is a professional man"(1957, 7). For him, the 
conflict in the modern officer and political leader relation is rooted in the essence of 
professionalism.   
  
Huntington understands professionalism as characteristics of the modern officer that 
distinguish him for yesterdays warrior (1957, 7). These characteristics are "expertise, 
responsibility, and corporateness" (1957, 8). Modern officer corps should be equipped not only 
with advanced technology but also should be expert "with specialized knowledge and skill in a 
significant field of human endeavor" (1957, 8).  Such characteristic cannot be acquired but 
through high levels of education and skills especially that officers are responsible for the 
specialized use of violence. 
              
Modern officer corps is responsible for devoting its skills and knowledge to serving and 
protecting society and state (1957, 9). This responsibility is related to its expertise and 
knowledge in the specialized implementation of violence. Yet, it is not responsible for the 
management of violence. Managing violence is the responsibility of the state. Thus, officer corps 
cannot impose decisions on the state or force it to adopt certain orientations concerning any form 
of the national security policy. Officer corps can only explain his views and needs and provide 
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his advices to the state and aid the latter in the decision it makes (1957,16). To a certain extent, 
Huntington argues, "officer's behavior towards the state is guided by an explicit code expressed 
in law and comparable to the canons of professional ethics of the physician and lawyer. To a 
larger extent, the officer's code is expressed in customs, tradition, and the continuing spirit of 
profession" (1957, 16).  
 
           Modern officer corps corporateness refers to the "share sense of organic unity and 
consciousness" between the corps members, as they perceive themselves as "a group apart from 
laymen" (Huntington 1957, 10). In this sense, officers corps possess "high degrees of 
specialization of labor and responsibilities within the profession" (1957, 10). Military is a closed 
organization. It has its own hospitals, markets, schools and housing, industries, and even military 
police and courts. This made the military autonomous more than any other institution in the 
government or society. 
 
Due to this autonomy, certain values and ideologies developed among officer corps, 
which Huntington might refer to as the 'military mind'. Military mind, according to him, is 
characterized of being conservative, realistic, and pessimistic about human nature (1957, 59-79).  
 
He adds that ""the military function is performed by a public, bureaucratized profession 
expert in the management of violence and is responsible for the military security of the state" 
(1957, 61). In this sense, military officer's responsibilities affect his attitude towards the state in 
many ways:  
(1) He "views the state as the basic unit of political organization,  
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(2) He tends to "stress the continuing nature of the threats to the military security of the 
state and the continuing likelihood of war",  
(3) He tends "to emphasize the magnitude and immediacy of the security threats" (1957, 
64-5). 
 
In Huntington's view, on the level of decision-making: 
 "The military man rarely favors war.  The military man will always argue 
that the danger of war requires increased armaments; he will seldom argue 
that increased armaments make war practical or desirable. He always favors 
preparedness, but he never feels prepared. Accordingly, the professional 
military man contributes a cautious, conservative, restraining voice to the 
formulation of state policy" (1957, 69)   
 
In fact, according to Huntington, "if the statesman decides upon war which the soldier 
knows can only lead to national catastrophe, then the soldier, after presenting his opinion, must 
fall to and make the best of a bad situation" (1957, 76)  
 
It is clear that Huntington emphasizes the supremacy of state in the military-state relation. 
Modern officer corps should devote all his knowledge, experience, and skills to serving the state. 
In fact, he argues that "the existence of a military profession depends upon the existence of 
nation-states…the military man consequently tends to assume that the nation-state is the ultimate 
form of organization" (1957, 65).  
 
Yet, he distinguishes between a democratic country that is ruled by civilians and a 
totalitarian one that is ruled by military force. Civilian control or state supremacy is "identified 
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with democratic government, military control with absolutist or totalitarian government" (1957, 
82). He argues that, 
 "In democratic countries… policy is determined by persuasion and 
compromise; in absolutist countries it is determined by force and coercion. 
Hence, the military who control the most powerful instrument of violence, 
will be more powerful in totalitarian countries than in democratic ones" 
(1957, 82)      
 
However, this assumption is not applicable to all countries (democracies or totalitarian). 
Huntington argues that, 
"In a democratic country, the military may undermine civilian control and 
acquire great political power through the legitimate processes and institutions of 
democratic government and politics. In a totalitarian regime, on the other hand, 
the power of the military my be reduced by breaking the officer corps up into 
competing units, establishing party armies and special military forces, 
infiltrating the military hierarchy with independent chains of command 
(political commissars), and similar techniques" (1957, 82)  
 
To sum up Huntington's thoughts on military-state relations he argues, "The state is the 
active directing element of society and is responsible for the allocation of resources among 
important values including military security" (1957, 3). 
 
The military-state relations in many MENA countries fit, to a certain extent, Huntington's 
totalitarian countries framework. Barry Rubin gives a description of military-state relations in 
the MENA during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Most countries in the region were emerging as 
independent states after long decades of European colonialism. Thus," the armed forces were the 
most effective national institution and, at times, the armed forces were the most effective 
one"(Rubin 2002, 1). He argues, "Every military officer could hope to become his country's ruler 
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some day. The armed forces were highly politicized and rulers field to control them" (2002, 1).  
   
To understand this trend, Roger Owen specifies, "Most Third World armies were 
originally modeled on the European military organizations and used to fight colonial wars with 
European weapons and tactics" (2004, 179). After independence and during the period of state 
building the first reforms introduced in an effort to modernize the state were also army reforms 
on a European model (Finer1962, 221). Officer corps was thus among the first institutions in the 
state to adopt western ideologies of nationalism, secularism, westernization, constitutionalism, 
socialism and science. Yet, consolidating independence was not an easy task in the new 
independent states. "Incompetent and corrupt" governments carried out reforms and 
development as "state system had not yet stabilized and institutionalized itself" (Rubin 2002, 1-
10). 
      
 Military officers saw that weak governments created a power vacuum that only the 
military could fill (Finer 1962, 242). They argued, "Politics was too important to be left to the 
politicians, whom they saw -by no means inaccurately- as incompetent and corrupt" (Rubin 2002, 
1). Politicians circumvented development process to build their particularistic patronage 
networks. In this sense, the military, as the only well organized institution, was drawn into the 
power vacuum.  
  
The Military responsibilities in many MENA countries were not only to protect the state 
from external threats (what Huntington calls military security policy). In fact, the military of 
many MENA states proved to fail in this area, such as the cases of wars against Israel 1948, 
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1967, and 1973. After 1973 and due to the Israeli acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, 
the function of Middle Eastern military became prestigious more than protective.  
 
In this sense, the military had new functions to perform such as "to maintain internal 
control and stability, to serve as a symbol of independence, to perform certain modernizing 
functions, and to uphold the honor of the state"(Bill & Leiden 1979, 50-1). Yet, perhaps the most 
important role of MENA militaries is "maintaining a regime in power". In this role, the military 
devotes all its capacities and capabilities to protect the government from "its potential or actual 
internal foes"(Bill & Leiden 1979, 251). Usually in such situations the military declares a 'state 
of emergency' under which repressive measures are taken to put down turbulence, end hostilities, 
eradicate opposition, and apply strict rules on people. Many MENA countries lived through this 
state of emergency such as "Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Sudan, Libya, Syria, Algeria, and Morocco". 
In addition, there is the example of "Jordan's King Hussein who has owed his throne repeatedly 
to the loyalty of the military" (Bill & Leiden 1979, 251). 
 
From this perspective, the military main function in the MENA became the "regime's 
guardian rather than its principle challenger" (Rubin 2002, 10). This fact is very clear in case of 
Turkey. The Turkish military interfered many times in politics to preserve the secular state 
system and to ensure the implementation of Kemalism in Turkey's state and society. A similar 
case can be found in Algeria. When the victory of Islamists in the first round of elections 
threatened of creating an Islamist government, the military interfered and cancelled the electoral 
process (Rubin 2002, 10).  
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Due to the increasing influence of military in politics, the region witnessed significant 
number of military coups or military interventions during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. For 
example, in July 1952 Egypt witnessed a military coup led by Jamal Abdel Nasser who removed 
King Faruk and founded the republic of Egypt. In Syria, November 1970 Hafez Assad, leader of 
the Ba^ath Party and a military officer, overthrow the president of Syria. Sudan had military 
coups in 1958, 1969, and 1989. In Yemen, "the latest military coups was in 1979 and led by Ali 
Abdullah Al-Salah who promoted himself to field marshal" (Rubin 2002, 3). In Iraq, July 1958, 
inspired by Jamal Abdel Nasser, officers led by brigadier Abdul-Karim Qassem overthrow the 
Hashemite monarchy and proclaim a republic. In Turkey, 1980, military coup put the republic 
under the rule of national Security Council for almost three years. 
 
 A group of military conspirators might carry on coup d'état due to many reasons such as 
"profound economic distress, political corruption, political stalemate, affronts to military 
corporate values, threats of injury to the military corporate, or for no reason other than a thirst 
for power" (Karsten 1998, 225). The first three reasons are common in most MENA countries. 
For example, Turkey witnessed a military coup on March 12, 1971, which overthrew the elected 
government due to "anarchy, fratricidal strife and social and economic unrest" (Hale 1994, 184). 
The government had failed to deal with widespread political violence and chaos generating from 
conflict between Marxist and ultra-right forces, and unsuccessful social and economic reforms 
(Hale 1994). 
 
         Rustow and Huntington argue that motivations leading to military interventions or coups 
are not to be found in "history of armies or of wars but in the relationship of the military with the 
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remainder of the political structure" in the context of political modernization (Rustow 1967, 175). 
MENA countries initiated political modernization in order to reach ultimately a system where, 
on the one hand, the government is able to deal effectively with social, economic and political 
problems, and on the other hand, the people has the political platform to evaluate the 
government  performance. This will make them view it as a legitimate source of authority, and 
therefore do not resort to radical opposing groups. 
 
Military interventions and coups are the product of one specific aspect of modernization, 
which is "the general politicization of social forces and institutions" in the absence of effective 
political institutions that could coordinate their interactions (Huntington 1968, 194). In other 
words, in underdeveloped countries, such as most of the MENA, civil society is politicized. The 
increasing and uncontrolled involvement of agencies such as clergies, universities, bureaucracies, 
corporations and, the military with 'general political issues' and not specific to their interests is 
due to the lack of "autonomy, complexity, coherence, and adaptability" of political institutions 
(Huntington 1968, 194). In this sense, the extensive political participation increases chaos 
because actors that are more social are becoming deeply involved in general political issues 
without any coordination between them. In such an institutional vacuum, social groups resort to 
their own methods in organizing and dealing with political issues, the military resorts to the 
method of a coup.  
            
To sum up, the military in developed and developing countries is deeply committed to 
the state security and survival. In developed countries, the military is characterized of being 
professional. It is experienced, well organized, and responsible of state's external, internal, and 
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situational security without imposing or forcing his decisions on political leaders. Contrary to 
this, military in developing countries is devoted to protecting the existing regime from internal 
threats, especially those coming from opposing groups. It is the regime's guardian.  
 
Military-Society relations 
 Since the military is responsible for the safety of the state, then it is responsible for the 
safety of society "individually and collectively" as well (Huntington 1957, 9). Due to the 
importance of these functions, the military acquires special skills and values, such as the 
capacity for organizing, using violence, corporateness, and self-sufficiency. The military's 
unique structure facilitates fast decision-making process and professional execution of decisions. 
These institutional characteristics (expertise, responsibility, and corporateness) provide the 
military with the capability to carry out social action other than external or internal defense 
functions (Huntington 1957, 14-18).  
 
In this sense, the military, due to his professionalism, is generally capable of assisting 
society in modernizing. In fact, there exist deep "relations between armed force organizations 
and societies in the transition to relatively modernized states" (Levy 1971, 66).In societies 
experiencing modernization, the military plays an important role in social mobilization. For 
example, Egyptian military served as an important socialization agent in Egyptian society since 
1952. In the military, modernity education was employed with traditional background and placed 
in a classless framework, which provided the soldier with the prospect of social mobility through 
promotion based on advantages and skills rather than class/kinship aspects (Levy 1971, 66-8). 
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However, social mobilization might lead different social actors (groups or individuals) 
into the political arena. Some actors will try to intervene in the political order and push for 
political or economic change in their favor. Martin Needler explains this situation as he argues 
that: 
  "It may be interpreted to the military by those trying to secure their 
intervention as a threat to the personal interests of military officers. 
Such as challenge in the economy at large, to the military in its role of 
preserver of domestic order, or, most likely, as a long-term threat to 
the special statues and privileges, and even continued existence, of the 
military institution" (Needler 1971, 84) 
  
 
In this sense, political and economic development, in other words modernization, of 
social groups has a profound effect on society-military relations. Rustow argues that 
modernization is a revolutionary process that reconstructs the intellectual, technological, and 
social aspects of any society or group in society (D. Rustow 1967, 6). In many Third World 
societies, mobilized social groups threaten the military and to face such threats military takes 
certain measures such as:  
"(1) military intervention which increasingly takes the form of an 
attempt by the possessing classes to maintain the status quo 
 (2) Military intervention, which is directed against legally, elected 
'governments' heading constitutional regimes 
(3) Interventions to forestall the election and inauguration of 
reforming 'governments 
 (4) Popular resistance to military intervention resulting in greater 
likelihood that a military coup will lead to open fighting" (Needler 
1971, 84-5) 
 
   
To a certain extent, this viewpoint describes the situation in many MENA societies. The 
military was the only well organized institution after independence and due to its responsibility 
as the regime guardian; military intervened in politics to contain social groups who, by 
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participating in state politics such as elections, threatened its interests.  Clear example is seen in 
case of Turkey. Turkish military sees himself as the guardian of the secular republic and 
Kemalists secular reforms. In addition, he sees himself as a force that integrates people from all 
orientation, classes, and social backgrounds in one nation. Yet, when the Welfare Part threatened 
the military's interests in preserving the secular state system, he forced Welfare leader and his 
party out of the government in 1997 (Rubin 2002, 9-12). 
 
 To sum up, the military-society relation is asymmetry relation. The military plays a great 
role in mobilizing, modernizing, and integrating social groups in the political order he guards. 
Yet, when social groups are politically mature and try to carry on political development and even 
political changes that might threatens military interests, he intervene, in some cases, to preserve 
the status quo.  
 
Military-Democracy Relations 
 Huntington argues, in one of the approaches to analyzing 'military mind' he mentioned in 
his book "The Soldier and the State", that a military man is "thought to be opposed to 
democracy" and in favor of organizing "society on the basis of a chain of command". He also 
"favors aggressive and bellicose national policies" (1957, 60). Yet, he argues, this is not the case 
in developed countries, which are mostly democracies. In democracies, professional military 
devotes all his skills and capabilities to serving the state and the nation but never leads them. 
Huntington asserts that officer corps advises political leaders, who are elected leaders, and carry 
out their decisions without forcing his own. Only civilian government, which is elected by the 
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people, has the authority and the responsibility to decide and manage the use of violence 
(Huntington 1957, 16 & 59-79). 
 
Huntington's emphasis on civilian control over military highlights a fundamental 
principle of democracy. This principle is that the people elect those who have the authority to 
govern people and decide the fate of the nation. 
 
In addition, professional military is responsible for protecting state and society from 
external and internal threats. Thus, it is not bias to any social, ethnic, or religious groups or 
political viewpoints. Its loyalty is to the state, to the political order, to the rule of law, and to 
principles of democracy (Huntington 1957, 14-16). 
 
The situation in most MENA countries is very different. The military is seen, as 
mentioned previously, as the most effective institution in society that produces the best-educated 
individuals. Thus, the military functions exceeded defending state and society to performing 
functions such as "set up state-controlled economies, introduce a just distribution of wealth, and 
promote a new citizenship based on democracy and political participation" (Picard 1993, 552). 
Thus, the military became more politicized. 
 
MENA regimes headed by ex-military officers such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and 
Pakistan are mainly ruled by one-party system and power is concentrated in the president's hands. 
These non-democratic regimes rely on the military as their guardian. In monarchies, such as 
Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and the Gulf States, the military also supports the rulers. In Turkey, the 
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only democracy in the region, although the military is clearly controlled by the civilian 
authorities; yet, the military still intervene in politics when he sees a threat to the state system 
(Rubin 2002, 1-21). 
 
From this perspective, the military acts as a representative of the state who maintains the 
right to veto decisions it considers dangerous to the external or internal security of the state. At 
the same time, the military do not interfere directly in day-to-day affairs of the people. Military 
also acts as a guardian, where it intervenes occasionally to put things in order, then returns to the 
barracks. Finally, it can set up a ruler regime where it intervenes directly, assumes power, and 
runs the country (Rubin 2002, Owen 2004, Bill & Leiden 1979). 
 
To sum up, the military interference in politics in many of the MENA countries 
constituted obstructed the process of democratization, if existed. Its function as the regime 
guardian and its loyalty to the rulers rather than the state, nation, and law made him get in the 
way of legislative process, such as elections. Clear examples could be seen in the cases of 
Turkey 1960, 1971, and 1980 and Algeria 1991-1992.  
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Islamists-Civil Relations:  
Conceptions of State, Society, & Democracy 
 
The end of World War I (WWI) marked the beginning of a new era in the history of the 
MENA region. The last Muslim political dynasty, the Ottomans, ended in the aftermath of the 
war. The Ottoman Empire, a German ally, was defeated, divided, and occupied by the victorious 
great powers (mainly France and Great Britain). The sultanate was formally eradicated in Turkey 
by the secular reformists in order to establish the new Turkish nationalism led by Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk. In other part of the MENA, the Qajar dynasty in Iran was ousted and Reza Shah, the 
new leader, worked to create a new state system (Cleveland 2004, 175-192).  
 
Kemal Atatürk and Reza Shah, secularist leaders, worked to limit the influence of Islamic 
traditions, principles, and institutions in state and society. In most of the rest of the MENA 
countries, similar Westernizing reforms and the development of more secularist nationalism and 
westernized elites dominated. Herein, Islam was not seen as an obstacle to westernizing and 
modernizing attempts, but it did not fit the framework or political agenda of the emerging Arab, 
Turkish, Persian, and many other forms of nationalism that appeared in the region, such as the 









In the post World War II (WWII) era, MENA countries became politically independent 
as the European imperialism ended. The rise of nationalism as well as Westernization was the 
most noticeable political dynamics in the region. 
After independence and the establishment of western-like states and regimes, 
 "Islam was the chief vehicle of political opposition in North Africa and the 
Middle East, regardless of official state ideology, political system, or 
leadership. Weather in communist Afghanistan, socialist Algeria, 
revolutionary Libya, secular Tunisia, 'socialist and then' pro-Western Egypt, 
divided Lebanon or puritanical Saudi Arabia, the generalization holds true" 
(Hynes 1994, 64) 
 
 
 In another places, "in states as diverse as Turkey, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Trinidad, Islamic groups strained the relationship between governments and governed"(Hynes 
1994, 64).  
 
           In this sense, the role of political Islam and Islamists became increasingly essential for the 
political stability of the region. Modernizing MENA societies were "characterized by strong 
patterns of religious influence" (Bill & Leiden 1979, 74). 
 
 The question then becomes; what do Islamists want? On the one hand, Islamists call for 
"partial or total rejection of Western values, lifestyles, legal systems, and ideologies". On the 
other hand, they call for "strict(er) observance of Islamic codes of personal conduct and demands 
for the enforcement of the Shari^a. Generally, there is dissatisfaction with the political and 
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economic status quo and the common political and economic corruption of ruling elite". In other 
words, "the goal of all Islamic movements may be some form of Islamic state"(Hynes 1994, 64). 
               
             Almost all political Islam scripts agree that establishing an Islamic state is a necessity. In 
fact, it is an obligation on Muslims because through this state they could implement the Islamic 
law (Shari^a) and spread Islamic teachings through society (Ali 1999, 120). The focus of such 
scripts was the importance to take all measures in order to restore the Islamic Holy codes 
(Shari^a) to face the increasing influence and the widespread of alien ideas (mainly western 
ideologies and values) in Muslim societies. This cannot be done except through a strong Islamic 
state. In this sense, the establishment of an Islamic state became crucial to protect Islam and 
ensure its continuity (Ali 1999, 120).  
     
           Yet, questions become, what type of state is the Islamic state? Is it a theocracy?  
Islamists scholars were concerned of finding answers to such questions. Among them was the 
Syrian Islamist thinker 'Mohammad Rashid Rida' 2 whose "conception of an acceptable did not 
differ profoundly from Ayatollah Khomeini's". This conception was built on two main factors: 
"the restoration of rule by an Islamic leader and the paramountcy of Shari^a" (Haynes 1994, 66). 
From this perspective, Islam is not separate from the state, which is governed by a religious 
leader. In fact, many Islamist scholars, such as Fahmi Howaydi3, refuse labeling the state of 
being Islamic or a nation-state because this classification infer the idea of separating Islam from 
the state (Ali 1999, 122-3). They argue that if a state is categorized of being a civil state this 
does not necessarily means the state and society are governed by secular civil laws and not by 
                                                 
2  Died in 1935 (Haynes 1994, 66) 
3 A contemporary Egyptian Islamist thinker (Ali 1999) 
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Islam. Contrary to this, they argue, if the state is categorized of being Islamic this does not mean 
that the state is not civil. Howaydi and others like him distinguished between the executive 
authorities, whose responsibility in the Islamic state is to implement Shari^a, and the social 
contract that is called the state. As the 'Shari^a' is implemented, the form, type or label of the 
state does not matter (Ali 1999, 122-3). This thought of a theocracy can be summarized in 
Hassan Al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (1929), declaration that 
"Islam is a state and a religion at the same time" (Ali 1999, 123). 
 
            Many other Islamist scholars, such as Mohammad Imarah4, argue that Muslims are not 
obliged to establish an Islamic state. Yet, they argue, in order for Muslims to practice their 
religion in today's world they need to establish a state that is governed by Islamic rules (Ali 
1999, 124). However, the Islamic state they call for is not a theocracy. A theocratic state 
conception assumes that there is a particular religious authority or group within the Islamic 
tradition that has exceptional privilege given to them by God and therefore has the right and 
power to impose divine will in state and society. This conception is also based on the history of 
Europe in the dark ages when the Pope (heading a religious hierarchy) was considered as the 
representative of God on earth; thus, all his rules were considered divine without questioning 
their sources. For Imarah and other Islamists who share his belief, this is where the argument 
fails in relation to Islam, because the Islamic tradition, at least in the majority Sunni teaching, 
does not recognize a pope-like figure, nor does it preach the establishment of a religious class 
that has special access to divine will (Ali 1999, 118-131).   
  
                                                 
4  An activist Islamist thinker in Egypt (Ali 1999, 124) 
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  In addition, they believe that after the Prophet Mohammad, there is no one who has 
direct access to God’s revelation, and therefore no individual or group has the authority or the 
right to declare unquestionable decrees in the Muslim community. Thus, an Islamic political 
system is not an inherently theocratic. It is guaranteed that the laws, principles, and spirit of the 
Quran and Hadith, which serve as the complete and total sources of a constitution in an Islamic 
state, bind the Islamic political system (Ali 1999, 118-131). 
 
        Although Islamists do not agree on the specific details and form of the Islamic state, all of 
them agree on the necessity of establishing an Islamic state that applies the Islamic law. In this 




Islam has always been a vital element in Muslim communities. It affected the political, 
socioeconomic, and cultural dynamics of the modernization processes while in turn being 
affected by them. During the period when the Ottoman Empire became very weak and European 
colonialists occupied many of its territories, Muslims started soul-searching for the causes of 
decline of the Muslim Empire and societies. Many Muslims concluded that drifting from the path 
of Islam and its teachings had been responsible for the loss of the past glory. Their prescription 
for restoring this glory was a return to Islam as well as elimination of foreign ways. In this sense, 
the Islamic resurgence was a religious response to the loss of independence and sovereignty (Ali 
1999, Schulze 2000, Cleveland 2004).  
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After WWII, in the independent states of the MENA region, Islam had to face the alien 
concepts of nation-state, nationalism, secularization, and westernization. Society was governed 
by nationalist and, in many cases, secular elite who worked to reduce the influence of Islam in 
state and society. In these societies, Muslims were citizens and believers at the same. In other 
words,  
"Nationalist elites attempted to give the nation a modern political meaning in 
seeking to deprive religion of its role as the organizing principle of society. A 
cultural significance was given to national affairs by using Islam as a control 
mechanism, which served to legitimize the established order and functioned 
as means of identity designed to reaffirm endogenous cultural values" (Allam 
2004). 
 
Due to this fact, Islam played a dual role in society. On the hand, ruling elite incorporated 
Islam in their state apparatus in order to legitimize their rule. On the other hand, Islam was the 
main theme that "gathered individuals as a structural means of identity" (Allam 2004). Yet, "two 
elements that were destined to deprive religion of its role as a central element of society were 
secularization and nationalism. Secularization sought to replace religion as the main foundation 
of identity, loyalty, and authority, while nationalism proposed that religion be replaced by the 
nation as the new cult object"(Allam 2004).  
 
By containing Islam and limiting its influence in society, rulers carried out their 
secularization and modernization reforms. In fact, "the de-Islamization of the public definitely 
corresponded to a need for international recognition" (Schulze 2000, 125). People in the MENA 
societies were caught by such reforms while at the same time trying to hold on to religious and 
cultural beliefs. Thus, the rise of Islamism was mainly the result of modernization and 
secularization attempts (Bill & Leiden 1979, 62-9).  
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To face these attempts, Islamists created civil association such as the establishment of the 
Muslim Brother in Egypt (1929) and the Islamic Society in India (1941). Since the beginning, 
Islamists tried to establish branched in other societies such as the case of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. They succeeded in Syria in 1945 when "several Syrian neo-Salafi (Fundamentalists) 
organizations, among them the Syrian Society of Muslim Youth and an older group of Muslim 
Brothers from Damascus formed the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood under the leadership of 
Mustafa al-Siba^i (1915-1964)" (Schulze 2000, 127). Muslim Brotherhood also succeeded in 
establishing branches in Palestinian territories in 1946, the Islamic liberation movement in Sudan 
in 1947, and the Society of Muslim Brothers in Iraq during the same period. Yet, they failed to 
establish branched in Saudi Arabia because the Saudis claimed, "the Muslim brotherhood was 
inconsistent with the Saudi Arabian law of associations" (Schulze 2000, 127). However, neither 
one of the Islamist associations could offer any alternative to modernization or nationalism. They 
could not even help other Muslims, in India, Indonesia, and many other places in MENA, in 
facing the pressure of secular rulers and modern states (Schulze 2000).    
 
With the rise of socialism in many MENA countries after WWII, Islamists were able to 
co-exist in society with this ideology since it had "no bearing up on the social order of Islamic 
societies" (Schulze 2000, 129). Due to the spread of socialism, Islamists started to pay more 
attention to social issues. Still, they focused their efforts to transform society into a society 
governed by Shari^an .In Egypt, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood adopted "socialist 
arguments and loudly declared themselves for an Islamic socialism"(Schulze 2000, 129). This 
labeling was mainly motivated by the belief that the West is attempting to destroy Islam. Yet, 
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Islamists did not care whether the head of state was a monarch or a military officer, whether he 
cooperated with the United States or the Soviet Union because for them the ruling elite's goal 
was to crush them and contain Islam. 
 
Many types of Islamists exist in MENA societies. Analyst Barry Rubin (1998, Vol. 2) 
classified Islamist groups into three types: revolutionaries, national liberationalists, and 
reformists. 
(1) Revolutionaries are those who use violence in order to induce change in society and 
government. For example, Islamist groups in Algeria, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq are carrying 
out armed resistance to overthrow the existing governments and to transform society. 
Rubin argues, "aside from Algeria, these are all relatively small underground 
organizations though they have larger circles of supporters. The most repressive states--
Syria and Iraq--have had the greatest success in suppressing such insurgencies, which 
embody grievances which are otherwise barred from expression, much less 
solution"(Rubin 1998). He noted that the Syrian and Iraqi Islamist movements represent 
ethnic-national sects. The same holds for Saudi Arabia, where radical Wahhabis groups 
also organized violent attacks.  
 
On the other side, Rubin argues that Algeria is facing a complete revolution 
because of the military's refusal to allow "a broad-based, reformist Islamic group, the 
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), to attain an electoral victory"(Rubin 1998). The FIS are, to 
some extent, willing to negotiate with the government and compromise. In addition, some 
other revolutionary Islamist groups negotiated successfully with the government like the 
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Islamic Brotherhood, which made a compromise with the Egyptian government. Rubin 
argues that the Egyptian government "let the Brotherhood participate in electoral politics, 
hold parliamentary seats, and function as a movement. However, the permissible lines are 
clearly set. Periodic repression and vote-rigging demonstrate to the Brotherhood that it 
will not be permitted to gain power and will be crushed if it seems to pose a threat of 
seizing power"(Rubin 1998). On the other side, more extreme Islamist groups, like the 
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria, reject any compromise. 
  
(2) National liberationists: This type refers to the groups that launch violent activities against 
other nations. Rubin gives the examples of the Palestinian (Hamas and Islamic Jihad) and 
Lebanese (Hezbollah) groups. He claims that they have a dual purpose. On the one side, 
they wish to establish an Islamic state among their own people; yet, their main concern 
has been fighting others. Rubin argues, "Hamas and Islamic Jihad have launched terrorist 
attacks on Israelis while competing for popular support with the PLO- ruled Palestinian 
Authority (PA). The PA arrests their activists and refuses to let them seize power, but 
there is also a strong measure of mutual tolerance to prevent a civil war"(Rubin 1998). In 
addition, he mentions, "within Lebanon, Hezbollah attacked Israel and its allies in 
southern Lebanon. At the same time, Hezbollah tries to seize power within the Shi^as 
community and in the country as a whole"(Rubin, 1998).  
 
(3) Reformists: The last type refers to Islamist groups who "avoided violence and act as 
social and parliamentary movements"(Rubin 1998). In Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, Tunisia, 
Turkey, and Pakistan Islamic parties have largely participated in the political processes 
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and opposed the regime from within the system. Rubin argues, "Acting within the legal 
system allows them to have influence and bring about some changes"(Rubin 1998). The 
Islamists argue, "These techniques win followers and provide a springboard for seizing 
power in the future"(Rubin 1998).    
 
In MENA society today, the Islamist segment is composed of a wide range of 
associations whose objective is maintaining and spreading the Islam in society. These 
associations are among the most active and widespread informal institutions in society. This is 
because they provide "charitable and social services such as medical care, education, 
employment assistance, teaching, as well as religious instructions and spiritual guidance" 
(Hawthorne 2004). Some of these associations relate back to the old branches established by 
Islamists early in the twentieth century such as those established by the Muslim Brotherhood in 
many MENA states. However, most of them are new "being part of the Islamic 
resurgence"(Hawthorne 2004). Yet, not all new Islamist associations are free from governmental 
control and political orientations. Some Islamist organizations are directed and funded by "state 
religious establishments and they propagate mainstream religious doctrine through education and 
charity work"(Hawthorne 2004). Other associations are free from governmental control. At the 
far boundaries of the Islamist segment there are "radical movements, such as Egyptian Islamic 
Jihad and al Qaeda that employ terrorism and indoctrination to achieve their vision of a properly 
“Islamic” society" (Hawthorne 2004). 
 
  To sum up, Islamists believe that their society has drifted apart from the traditional 
Islamic path due to colonialism, modernization, westernization, and nationalism. They want to 
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change this situation and restore what they feel is the authentic Muslim society that had been 
mutated by European colonialists. At the most basic level, Islamists believe that their societies 
should be founded upon, organized, and run according to Islamic law as found in. Moreover, 
they emphasize that the moral corruption of the modernization and secularization attempts 
5should be minimized in their societies through strict moral codes. 
 
Islamists-Democracy Relations  
            The goal to establish an Islamic state has been dynamic factor that motivated all 
Islamist groups throughout the Muslim world effectively since the inter-war period. However, 
in the independent, secular, and national MENA states that emerged following the de-
colonization of Muslim countries, this goal faced the challenge of political repression and 
authoritarianism. The post-colonial history of most MENA involved a "passage from a brief 
period of competitive elections to several decades of one party rule, followed, in some cases at 
least, by the revival of a more open political system in the 1980s and 1990s" (Owen 2004, 131). 
Establishing democracy in the Muslim world has always been hard and sometimes bloody. 
Military coups, westernized elites, and tribal/traditional leaders usually exclusively control 
state power. In addition, improvement in liberalizing societies, modernizing institutions, and 
developing democratic infrastructures was generally slow and limited. This situation led to a 
combination of political and economic stagnation, and the dissatisfaction of many people who 
had no democratic platform to reform the system. As a result, a fertile ground was created for 
Islamists to grow and gain more strength. 
 
                                                 
5  Freedom to do things rejected by Islam such as immodesty, sexual promiscuity, drinking, drug use, greed, 
secularism, vulgarity…etc  
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In the early stages of Islamists political activities, Sayyed Qutb (1906-1966) was the first 
extremist's scholar to declare that democracy is blasphemy (Al-Turaby et al 2003, 60-3). His 
political belief was built on two foundations: first, the supremacy of God's rules; and second, 
the rejection of fabricated rules. He believed that God's rules organize the human life in all its 
political, social, economic, and religious aspects. Therefore, he argued, all nations (Islamic or 
non-Islamic) and all states (Islamic or non-Islamic) should yield to the Islamic perception of 
the world and religion (Al-Turaby et al 2003, 60-3). From Qutb's perspective, Islamic law 
governs all political rights and liberties. The state has moral, collective, and political functions 
that are carried out within the Islamic context. Thus, the state has no right in establishing new 
political or pluralistic rights, liberties, or innovations (Al-Turaby et al 2003, 60-3).  
 
For Qutb, liberties, public welfare, and nation's autonomy are all united in the Islamic 
ideological framework. He argued that democracy does not allow this to take place because it 
spreads immoral concepts of liberties and individuality that threatens the social fabric of the 
Islamic state. In fact, he agued, pluralism opens the door for society's and Islam's enemy to 
reach authoritative office. Such positions could be used to fight Islam from within and to 
weaken the Islamic state and the nation's unity (Al-Turaby et al 2003, 60-3). From this 
perspective, Qutb rejected democracy and specifically liberal democracy (Al-Turaby et al 2003, 
60-3).          
Another Islamist scholar who adopted the same political orientation is the Algerian FIS 
leader Abbassi Madani. He followed the Muslim Brotherhood's political perception in rejecting 
democracy. He believes that Islam has its own form of democracy, which is Shura (consultation). 
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Thus, God's rule Shura should be the law applied in Muslim countries not some exported 
western ideology (Al-Turaby et al 2003, 60-4). 
 
  To sum up, Islamists believe that democracy gives sovereignty or power of rule to 
people, while Islam gives sovereignty or power of rule to God even in Shura, which would not 
allow for a 'government by the people'. The laws, principles, and spirit of the Quran and Hadith, 
which serve as the complete and total sources of a constitution in an Islamic state, bind the 
Islamic political system. In this sense, breaking or defying any sacred teaching of Islam could 
not be accepted in an Islamic political system, for doing so would be going against the sources 




Military-Islamists: Confrontations & Containment 
 
Since late nineteenth century, Islamists searched for a solution to the political and 
religious crisis caused by Western, specifically European, imperialism. They also searched for 
an answer to the question of why did the Ottoman Islamic Empire decline and what had gone 
wrong with Muslim society. Islamists believed that the secularists' elite were responsible for this 
situation. They supported the rejection of the Western ideologies and values, non co-operation 
with the new secular rulers, and holy war 'jihad' against them and the secular state. Secularists' 
elite in turn blamed traditional Islam for the decline. They saw Islamists as a threat to modern 
state and political order, advocated the separation of religion from the state in the context of the 
Western model of state, and worked to limit the influence of Islam in state and society. They 
also tended to suppress Islamists, sometimes by violent means, to prevent them from defying the 
system and achieving their goals. To carry out this aggressive policy towards Islamists, 
governments relied heavily on military forces.    
  
The Muslim Brotherhood6, "has been the ideological and institutional epicenter of 
fundamentalism7 in the Arab sphere and the Islamic world" (Derkmejian 1995, 73-4). Under the 
pressure of economic, social, and political crisis under British colonialism, many Egyptians 
joined the Brotherhood in search for "solutions for their psycho-spiritual, social, and economic 
problems". In this sense, they became "committed to revival of Islamic community without 
regards to sectarian or political divisions"(Derkmejian 1995, 75). In fact, the Muslim 
                                                 
6 founded in Egypt in 1929 by Hasan Al-Banna 
7  The writer means by fundamentalism "a search for the fundamentals of faith, and foundations of Islamic polity 
and the bases of legitimate authority". He argues, "Such formulation emphasizes the political dimensions of Islamic 
movements more than its religious aspect" (Derkmejian 1995, 4). Thus, his definition of fundamentalism is close to 
this paper's definition of Islamism.  
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Brotherhood "emphasized its commitment to a moral order transcending politics" and 
specifically "attempted to build an Ummah- an Islamic state within the Egyptian state" 
(Derkmejian 1995, 76). With such goals, the Muslim Brotherhood became a threat to the ruling 
regime and to the state itself (Derkmejian 1995, 76). Therefore, the Brotherhood was banned and 
government's agents assassinated Al-Banna.  
 
           Yet, the Brotherhood continued its activities secretly. They collaborated with the military 
officers who carried out the 1952 revolution against king Faruk. At first, the Muslim 
Brotherhood relations with the military corps were "cordial and often friendly" (Derkmejian 
1995, 77). However, it became apparent very soon after the revolution that Nasser's military 
regime was "moving toward a secular state rather than an Islamic polity" (Derkmejian 1995, 77). 
Therefore, the Brotherhood carried out activities against Nasser's regimes such as joining 
domestic opposition, leading demonstrations that called for civilian government, seeking help 
from regional opposition such as Jordan, and most importantly attempting to assassinate Nasser 
in October 26, 1954. The military corps, led by Nasser, response varied from crushing their 
opposition demonstrations, purging the Brotherhood sympathizers from the officer corps, 
repressing the Brotherhood Islamists through out the country by banning their activities and 
arresting their leadership along with "over four thousand member"(Derkmejian 1995, 77). Six 
members of the Brotherhood leadership were executed by Military council constituted of Jamal 
Salim, Hussein al-Shafi^i, and Anwar Al-Sadat, who were members of Nasser's military corps. 
Other Muslim Brotherhood leaders were imprisoned for life (Derkmejian 1995, 77).    
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            The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, like Egypt's, came out of social, economic, and 
political hardship under colonialism (French) and called for "the establishment of a 
comprehensive Islamic order. The Syrian Brotherhood was "suppressed by Colonel Adib al-
Shishakli8 in 1952"(Derkmejian 1995, 106-8). During the 1950s, the Brotherhood's activities 
were seen as dangerous by Ba^thists, Nasserites, and communists. The Brotherhood opposed the 
United Arab Republic (constituted of Egypt and Syria as one united Arab state in 1958) because 
of their "ideological opposition to Nasser"(Derkmejian 1995, 107). Nevertheless, no sever 
measures have been taken against them. However, when Ba^thists returned to power in 1963 
they contained the movement and banished its leader "Isam al Attar". Due to this escalation, the 
Muslim Brotherhood became the "implacable opponent of the Ba^ath" (Derkmejian 1995, 107). 
Soon after Hafiz al-Assad came to power in 1971, the pressing focus of the Brotherhood 
opposition to the regime was the demand that Islam be declared the state religion in the 
constitution. Yet, Assad's regimes failed to meet the Islamists demands. In this sense, they 
viewed the constitution as the product of a secular, Ba^thists ruling elite. Muslim Brotherhood 
militants staged a series of uprisings in February 1973 in predominantly Sunni cities, where the 
majority of their supporters reside, such as Hamah and Homs. A huge number of Islamists were 
killed and wounded in clashes between the troops and demonstrators (Derkmejian 1995, 103-
118). 
 
           In Iraq, the Islamist movement was dominantly Shi^as, contrary to the Syrian and 
Egyptian Islamists who were predominantly Sunni. Their counterparts in Iran weather under 
Shah or Khomeini (Derkmejian 1995, 121) mainly influenced them. 
                                                 
8 leader of the military corps who ruled Syria between 1949-1954 
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Since the beginning, Shi^as opposed the Iraqi Ba^thists leadership who constituted an officer 
corps. For example, "the Hizib al-Fatimi brought together Shi^it intellectuals and officers of 
Arab and Iranian origins to oppose the Ba^thi regime during the early 1970s"(Derkmejian 1995, 
121).  Yet, vicious opposition came from the Shi^as Islamic call Party (Hiab al-Da^wah) in1968. 
They adopted violence and militancy against Ba^thists regime because "they considered the 
government's secularist policies as being against Islam" they accused the government of "selling 
pork, bringing Islamic schools under government control, suspending religious publications, 
obstructing mosques repairs, and persecuting Shi^it clergy"(Derkmejian 1995, 122). The 
Ba^thists officer corps who lead Iraq responded by repressing, expelling, executing, and 
imprisoning many of the Islamists. Yet, Shi^it Islamists continued to call for the establishment of 
an Islamic state especially after the success of the Iranian revolution in 1979. However, when 
Saddam Hussein came to power in 1979, he arrested the Hiab al-Da^wah leader Baqir al-Sader 
and his sister Binit Al-Huda and executed them in April 1980 (Derkmejian 1995, 123).  
 
         Iraq, Syria, and Egypt constitute three cases, among many in the MENA, in which Islamist 
came in direct and deadly confrontations with the officer corps. In these cases, Islamists main 
goals were the establishment of an Islamic state and the application of the Islamic law. Secular 
officer corps considered such goals as threatening to the state and the ruling regime. In the case 
of Egypt, Nasser's regime adopted radical socialism that was considered by the Muslim 
Brotherhood as an alien western ideology. They pushed for they pushed for establishing an 
Islamic state but ended up jailed, exiled, or executed. The same goes for the Iraqi and Syrian 
whose officer corps adopted the socialist, secular Ba`thist ideology. Islamists in both countries 
had the same goals and faced the same fate as their counterparts in Egypt. 
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Toward the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, to overcome the drastic 
effects of their stiff policies in the 1970s, most Islamist movements started a process of broad 
reevaluation and revision of their strategies and goals. They attempted to resolve their traditional 
legality crisis and to fit themselves into a more flexible framework. What is significant about 
these reevaluations is their rapidity in absorbing tremendous overlapping circumstances in 
Islamists' surrounding environment. 
 
Islamists' rigid policies were largely based on the writings of Sayyed Qutb. His teachings 
laid the groundwork for the principle of social isolation by focusing on the belief that whoever is 
not loyal to what he called the Islamic Brotherhood (and his interpretation of Islam) is 
considered, by him and his group, infidels. Consequently, he helped in establishing static 
movements able neither to adapt to political changes in their societies nor to interact with their 
environment (Derkmejian 1995, 75-9 & 84-8).  
 
However, in the 1980s and 1990s, the Islamist movements grew closer to their 
surroundings by increasing their interaction with society, and adopting more productive and 
peaceful strategies and projects. They attempted to update their political ideology and to bring its 
framework into a new scope. They tried to disperse all concerns within their surroundings to win 
the trust of all classes of these societies. Their success in this strategy brought the movements 
from shade to light, from isolation to openness, and from defeat to success (Hammad 2001).  
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In their attempts to reevaluate their political goals and strategies, the Islamists went 
through two main stages. The first was during the 1980s. This represented what is called the 
stage of broad Islamic awareness in which the movements shifted from the state of religious 
preaching to mobilize people to the state of political speeches that address social, economic, and 
political issues as well as moral and religious issues. The second stage was during the 1990s 
where most of the Islamist movements, such as the Islamists in Jordan, discovered the 
shortcomings of the use of violence as means to achieve their political goals. In particular, the 
strategy of violence led them to lose many vital opportunities of growth and legitimacy, as they 
were subject to governmental repression and social backlash (Hammad 2001, 230-4). 
 
Consequently, these movements adopted strategies of peaceful involvement in the 
political process, regardless of the aims they are seeking after wining. These included working 
within the political system, participating in elections, and entering the parliament or even the 
government if it was possible. Such strategies were very different from the strategies of violence 
and contestation by weapons and assassinations that they had previously implemented (Hammad 
2001, 234-241). 
 
The changes in the Islamist movements' political goals and strategies were not universal; 
rather they differed from one movement to another. These changes may converge or diverge 
depending on the maturation, strength, and the political ideology of a particular movement 
(Hammad 2001, 234-241).  Among these changes adopted by many Islamist movements was the 
transformation into political parties. The reason for such change is to gain an official legitimacy 
under the state's law after being known only as a group that is legally unprotected by law and 
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subject to cancellation at anytime by the state. Among those groups who transformed into a 
political party are the group of Justice and Welfare in Morocco (Hammad 2001, 234-241).  
 
The goals of many Islamists changed as well. Instead of fighting fiercely to reestablish 
the Islamic state, the main common demands of the reformed Islamists became to put an end to 
the rule by the corrupt un-Islamic rulers and return to the purity of early Islam via the democratic 
means provided by the western political thought. They wanted to reach a compromise between 
their original goals, which they failed to reach, and the secular political order. In other words, 
instead of opposing violently the state they wanted to work within its system (Hammad 2001).  
 
In most countries of the MENA, the Islamists manifestos are becoming more frank in 
demanding government reform and more insistent that communities conform to Islamic 
standards of morality and not more than that (Hammad 2001). Most Islamists are shifting their 
behavior from a militant and extremist context that believes in destroying the system through 
violence and terror, to more moderate, peaceful, diplomatic, and accommodationist context that 
chooses to work within the political system (Hammad 2001). Their purpose is to bring justice, 
democracy, and equality to society after long periods of repression and dictatorship. Good 
examples could be seen in Turkey, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, and Yemen, 
where Islamists are trying to engage in the political process to shape the institutions of civil 
society, establish Islamic law, and monitor government actions (Hammad 2001). Nevertheless, 
some Islamist groups still believe in violence as their only recourse to reach power and build the 
Islamic state. This includes the extremist factions in Algeria (GIA), al-Gama^t al-Islamiah and 
al-Jihad in Egypt, and elements of Hezbollah in Lebanon (Hammad 2001). 
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Another change is about the concept of Islamists itself. Some movements undertook an 
advanced initiative by omitting the Islamist headline from their agenda, often for symbolic 
reasons, yet their political ideology remains intact (Hammad 2001, 234-241). The main reasons 
for such change is to refute the claim that the movements are monopolizing the name of Islam 
for political reasons and are justifying for themselves what is not permissible for the others under 
the name of Islam. An example of the movements that made such a change was previously know 
as the Islamic Orientation Movement in Tunisia, now known as the Movement of Renascence 
Nahda, also what was previously known as the Islamic Society of Morocco, now known as the 
National Recuperation Party (Hammad 2001, 234-241).     
 
Yet, the most important change is in the Islamists' political ideology which is the shift in 
their attitude towards Western values and ideologies specifically democracy. The concept of 
democracy was the most remarkable point of argument and the most open-ended issue in the past 
dialogue of Islamists. Many negative aspects were seen in it, including the freedom of belief, 
which was seen by the Islamists as a threat to the Islamic society and promotion to secularism 
(Hammad 2001, 234-241).  
 
Recent readings of the political speech of these movements show an important 
transformation toward the acceptance of the idea of democracy in spite of the general belief that 
it contradicts the Islamic political hierarchy. Weitzman and Inbar claim that this new trend in the 
Islamists political orientation "was not a solely Turkish phenomenon. The tactics of most groups 
who seek an Islamic solution to their societies' social and political problems changed in the 
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1980s, from unalterably opposing western notions of democracy to waging democratic 
campaigns against their states authoritarian regimes"(Weitzman & Inbar 1997, 66). The 
dominating current idea is that democracy has many positive elements, including its guarantee of 
the peaceful and smooth transfer of power to the majority. Islamists also view democracy as a 
guarantee to changing authority by elections. Thus, they could use democracy as means to apply 
the Islamic consultation (Shura). Democracy also promotes human rights that Islamists could use 
to protect themselves from repression of authoritarian regimes in most of the MENA countries 
(Hammad 2001, 234-241).  
 
The change in their ideological thinking encouraged many Islamist movements to engage 
in politics. For example, in Jordan, the Islamic Activity Front won 22 seats in the parliament in 
1989, and 16 seats in 1992 (Aljazeera Center of Researches & Studies, 2004). In Algeria, the 
Peaceful Society Movement, a moderate Islamist group created in 1989, won 69 seats in the 
parliament (2004) and it has three ministers in the Algerian ministers council(Aljazeera Center of 
Researches & Studies, 2004). In this sense, Islamist movements or parties seized to be a threat to 
the state.  
 
 However, many MENA states ban the establishment of any political party even if it was 
not Islamist such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, United Arab Emerits, Qatar, Oman, and 
Libya (Aljazeera Center of Researches & Studies, 2004). Thus, it is hard to know the orientations 
of Islamists as a political movement or party. 
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Not all Islamists adopt the same beliefs when it comes to democracy. Some Islamist 
parties, such as the FIS in Algeria (which is one of the two case studies examined in this paper) 
believed that democracy is basically a Western ideology and therefore essentially at odds with 
the values and principles of Islam. They believed that people in the MENA region have to 
choose between their religion and democracy (Schulze 2000, 268-272). Other Islamists groups, 
such as the AKP in Turkey (which is the other case study in this paper), tend to be more 
receptive to democratic ideas, practices, and institutions. The AKP is convinced that democracy 
is compatible with Islam (Abdul-Majed 2002). 
 
In another case, since the late 1980s, the Jordanian Islamists worked within the secular 
system by participating in elections since 1989 with no intentions to replace or destroy it. In fact, 
the Islamists have "espoused an ideology that has generally been consistent with democratic 
values". Their political agenda was "economically and socially rather conservative, supportive of 
Jordanian sovereignty and Hashemite rule, pro-Shari^a (Islamic law), and strongly against 
corruption and ostentation" (Robinson 1997). Contrary to many Islamists who "have publicly 
stated that they view democracy as a tactic, and once in power would abolish democracy in favor 
of an Islamic theocracy" such as the Algerian FIS, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood were 
"careful to link Islam with democracy itself" (Robinson 1997). In other words, the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Jordan has "been temperate in language and sober in its analysis of what was 
politically possible and desirable". In this sense, they represent what is called "political 
moderation"(Robinson 1997). This political moderation meant that the Islamists have 
demonstrated "both in language and in action, a respect for the democratic process and support 
for the existing regime". The leader of the Muslim Brothers in Jordan, Muhammad al-Dhunaybat, 
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confirmed that, "There is nothing in the Brethren’s strategy or policy that calls for toppling the 
regime. We are advocates of reform, gradual reform. We never believed in violence or 
intellectual terrorism” (Robinson 1997). 
 
To sum up, the conflict between secular officer corps and the Islamists in the MENA 
region persisted for decades. Many Islamist movements resorted to opposition, demonstrations, 
assassinations, and violence in order to establish an Islamic state. Mostly they were considered as 
a threat to the existing rulers and state. Therefore, the officer corps, as the regime guardians, 
banded, jailed, and executed many of them. When the difficulty to overcome military repression 
by violence became better understood, Islamists began to come up with strategies that are more 
creative and methods, which best utilize the available political opportunities. Many Islamist 
movements such as the Welfare Party in Turkey worked within the state system but still tried to 
change it towards rejecting secularism and adopting Islamic constitution they ended up 
overthrown from government by military coup in 1997. Other Islamists, such as the Jordanian 
Muslim Brotherhood, worked within the system with out posing any threat to the state or ruling 
elite. 
 
In this sense, it seems that the military-Islamists relation is function of both: the Islamists 
political agenda and speeches on the one hand, and the military role as the regimes guardian on 
the other. This leads us to the question this paper is trying to answer: How can Islamists establish 
non-violent relations with the military in order to reach power with out military intervention or 
coup d'état to interrupt their success? 
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By examining the theoretical bases of civil-military relations and the historical aspects of this 
relation in the MENA region the probable method for Islamists to reach power and form 
governments is by playing down their Islamists roots and abandoning their Islamists dreams of 
building an Islamic state on the ruins of the secular state. If they merge with the existing political 
order and use legislative means to represent and defend their interests as any other political 
parties then the officer corps will no long see them as a threat to the regime. In this sense, officer 
corps, as the regime guardian, will not intervene in the political process that might lead Islamists 
to rule. 
  
This paper attempts to support the previous assumption by examining two case studies: 




Context & Circumstances: The Military & Islamists  
In Turkish & Algerian Politics 
 At the end of the 20th century, Islamist groups have become active participators in the 
political process all over the MENA region. A new class of modern-educated elites leads them. 
This neo-Islamist revivalism became more politicized than before as it engaged in establishing 
parties and participating in elections. Yet, this movement still aims at implementing a more 
Islamically oriented state and society. In this sense, officer corps, as the state and regime 
guardian, had to prevent Islamists from reaching their goals.  
   
This chapter will examine two cases: the first case is Turkey's Islamists Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) who won elections in 2002 and managed to stay in power until today. 
The second case is the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) who won great majority in the first 
round of elections in 1991 but failed to reach power due to military intervention. Comparison 
between the two cases aims at finding the conditions or factors that helped Islamists in reaching 
and staying in power in the first case and the factors that prevented them form-reaching power in 
the second. The objective then is to find if there is a peaceful and perhaps cooperative 




Military Tolerance of AKP in Turkey Elections 2002  
 
Introduction  
The Turkish independent republic was declared in 1922 after the abolition of the Ottoman 
Empire. Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk or Father of Turk) headed the new state and undertook the job 
of completely remaking the Turkish society. Atatürk was a military officer who had introduced 
reforms, which he considered of vital importance for his country to be recognized internationally 
as a modern state. In his program of modernization reforms,  
"Secular government and education played a major role. Making 
religious faith a matter of individual conscience, he created a truly 
secular system in Turkey, where the vast Moslem majority and the small 
Christian and Jewish minorities are free to practice their faith. As a 
result of Atatürk's reforms, Turkey -unlike scores of other countries- has 
fully secular institutions" (Atatürk website 1999) 
 
By the time Atatürk died in 1938, a constitution had been adopted, Islam was removed as 
the state religion, Constantinople became Istanbul, and women obtained the right to vote 
(Sakallioglu 2002).  
 
Atatürk's successor, Ismet Inönü, managed unstable neutrality in World War II, and then 
directed Turkey through the transition to a true democracy. The opposition Democratic Party 
won the election in 1950. In 1960, and again in 1970, observant army officers, who considered 
the government's repressive ways a violation of the constitution, brought an overextended 
Democratic Party back into line. In 1980, political struggles and civil turbulence brought the 
country to a halt. Different groups caused chaos, supported on the one hand by the Soviet bloc 
and on the other by Islamists groups. In the centre, the two major political parties were blocked 
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from progress so badly that for months they could not elect a parliamentary president. The 
military stepped in again to induce common relief but at the price of authoritarian control and 
many human rights abuses. The leader of the military government, General Kenan Evren, 
resigned his military commission and became Turkey's new president (Jenkins 2001, 35-40).  
 
In 1983, the free elections brought Turgut Özal (centre-right party) to power. He 
stabilized the country and supervised a business boom, which lasted through the 80s. Özal's 
death in 1993 removed a powerful figure from Turkish politics and led the country to uncertainty 
and instability. The rest of the decade has seen unstable coalitions formed between dubious 
parties and recharged support for the religious right. It has also seen the establishment of the first 
Islamists government led by the Welfare Party leader Necmettin Erbakan in 1997. However, in 
early 1998, the officer corps initiated a 'soft coup' to overthrow the Islamist government. 
Turkey's Constitutional Court barred the Islamist Welfare Party, and along with it, previous 
Prime Minister Erbakan because the party was accused of working to weaken Turkey's secular 
democratic basis, but, ironically, the ban opened up the question of just how democratic Turkey 
is. A disturbing human rights record, an unstable economy, and the ongoing clashes with the 
Kurds further endanger Turkey's democratic bases (Jenkins 2001, 35-40).  
  
Early in 2001, the Turkish economy collapsed dramatically. More than one million 
people lost their jobs. Moving away from the worst economic disaster in the republic's history, 
tourism-dependent Turkey was delivered a further harsh blow by the events of September 11. 
The International Monetary Fund stepped in with a transfusion (Abdul-Majed 2002).  
In November 2002, the newly established Islamic Justice and Development Party won a 
landslide victory. It is still ruling until present day without military intervention. 
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Military Role in Turkish State, Society & Democracy 
Since its independence, Turkey was governed directly or indirectly by military. In fact, 
"the continued domination of Turkish politics by the country's military appears to be an 
anomalous anachronism, even an anathema" (Jenkins 2001, 5). Turkey has witnessed more free 
and popular parliamentary elections that led to civilian democratic rule than any other state in 
MENA (except for Israel). However, the military has intervened in politics almost every ten 
years in the name of protecting the state. Yet, after achieving its objectives, the military 
voluntarily handed power back to civilians (Jenkins 2001, 35-40). 
 
The Turkish military role, as any other military in the MENA, is the guardian of the state 
system and political order mainly from internal threats and occasionally from external dangers. 
At the internal level, the military has the role of "moderating power responsible for protecting 
the country against squabbling civilian politicians". Although the military interfered in politics to 
fulfill this role, it has "traditionally been reluctant either to seize power or to participate in the 
civilian administration". The military intentions have never been to deal with day-to-day issues 
of the political life. It only aimed to restore order and protect the status quo (Jenkins 2001, 6). 
The military intervene in politics was due to its belief that it has a "sacred duty to protect an 
indigenous ideology, namely Kemalism9"(Jenkins 2001, 7). This perception of military's role in 
the state included not only internal and external security threats but also threats to Kemalism.  
 
Kemalism refers to a Turkish form of modernizing. It represents a strict "commitment to 
secularism, territorial integrity, and cultural homogeneity"(Jenkins 2001, 7). For Kemalists there 
                                                 
9  Kemalism refers to the principles and reform laid down by the founder of the Turkish republic Kemal Atatürk  
 70
was only a Turkish nationalist ideology, a Turkish race, and a Turkish language. Furthermore, 
there were one party (The Republican People’s Party), one nation (Turks), and one leader 
(Atatürk) in the country. This ideology also identified internal enemies as communists, socialists, 
Islamists, Kurds, and other ethnic minorities such as Armenians, Lazes, Greeks, and Suryanis 
(Cleveland 2004, 175-184). In this sense, Kemalists perceived Islam as a potential danger for the 
modern national state. 
 
It was crucial, during the first years of the new republic, to spread Kemalism throughout 
Turkey. It has been taught "with an increasing intensity in both civilian schools and military 
academies, initially in an attempt to create an ideological bulwark against communism, but more 
recently to counter the two most dynamic ideological forces, radical Islam and Kurdish 
separatism"(Jenkins 2001, 7). In this sense, the Turkish military has been trained to fulfill his 
function as both "the guardian of the nation and of Kemalist doctrine.     
 
 Corruption in the political and bureaucratic circles of Turkey has always been an 
impeding problem. Politicians have "a poor reputation, being almost universally regarded as 
venal, incompetent, unprincipled, and self serving". They damaged the government image in the 
eyes of the public especially when clashes between them obstructed the governments work many 
times (Jenkins 2001, 7). In this sense, Turkish public view the military as the only stable and 
efficient institution, which they could rely on.  
 
This perception of the Turkish military rely on a social belief that "the military and 
military values lie at the heart of any definition of what it means to be Turkish"(Jenkins 2001, 9). 
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The notions of collectiveness, nationalism, and deep-rooted sentiment of belonging to the group 
affect Turkish society. Such notions are taught in history lessons to children in schools and to 
young people in universities and military academies with the emphasis that Turkish society is 
"like a huge family"(Jenkins 2001, 12). These history lessons stressed the role of the military and 
protecting the homeland. It pictured the military officer as an honorable worrier (Borthwick 
1980, 242-6). In this sense, the Turkish military became "synonymous with the Turkish 
nation"(Jenkins 2001, 13). 
 
Theoretically, Turkey led a multi-party democratic system since Atatürk died in 1938. 
Yet, the military intervened in politics during the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Its excuse was 
always to protect the national security of the state which is officially defined as "the protection 
and maintenance of the state's constitutional order, national presence, integrity, all political, 
social, cultural, and economic interests on the international level, and contractual law against any 
kind of internal and foreign threat"(Sakallioglu 2002, 189). However, the military returns power 
to civilians after they secure the state and the political order. Due to military interventions, 
Turkey represents a country in which "the tradition of constitutionally elected government is 
both interrupted and deeply rooted"(Sakallioglu 2002, 194). 
 
To sum up, Atatürk's desire to establish a strong nationalist modern Turkish state, based 
on western values and ideals turned into an ideology, Kemalism, which was adopted not only by 
the Turkish nation, but also by the military. In this modern republic, Turks perceived the military 
as the institution that won independence and laid the foundations of the new republic. Thus, the 
military was always seen as an honorable and stable institution, free from corruption. People 
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trusted the military. Such sentiments enhanced its role as the guardian of the state and nation. 
However, the military role stretched to include protecting the constitution and most importantly 
to protect Kemalism from any internal threat. Such threats are perceived by the army to be ethnic 
and religious. On the one hand, there is the Kurdish separation attempt, which threatens the 
autonomy of the nation and the integrity of the Turkish territories. On the other hand, there is 
Islamist resurgence threat. Therefore, in order for the military to carry on its mission as the 
system guardian, democracy had to be interrupted several times.   
 
Military-Islamists Relations: Collisions & Peace prospects  
 In Turkey, officer corps controlled Islamic institution, principles, and traditions 
soon after the establishment of the secular republic in 1923. Atatürk, who was a military general, 
carried out several reforms aimed at limiting the role of Islam in state and society:  
"He abolished the caliphate (a high religious position) and the system of 
religious endowments and foundations. He switched from Islamic to the 
western calendar, established Sunday as the day of rest, and decreed that 
Turkish should be written in the Latin rather than Arabic script. The Sharia 
was replaced by Turkish adaptations of European legal codes, and the veil for 
women and the fez for men were banned. Religious schools and Sufi fraternal 
associations were outlawed. The Directorate of Religious Affairs was 
organized within the office of the prime minister, and given charge of 
appointment and certification of religious leaders"(Borthwick 1980, 237) 
 
 
Islamic institutions, in that case, became public institutions whose employees are, to 
certain extent, civil servants "mostly secular"(Borthwick 1980, 237). 
   
Supporters of Islamizing Turkish society failed to deal with such reforms or prevent it. 
Their attempt to stage an insurgence against the secular state in the 1920s and 1930s failed to 
gain popular support. Atatürk and his military crushed it (Borthwick 1980). In general, Islamists 
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stayed secretive throughout the era of Atatürk's one-party rule. During the late 1940s, strict 
Kemalist's reforms loosened and "the government started to relax its antireligious politics". The 
ruling Republican People's Party (RPP) allowed the embellishment of religious schools that were 
in charge of training clergies10 . The party also allowed the establishment of a religious academy 
in Ankara University "Faculty of Divinity"(Borthwick 1980, 237). Yet, Islamic teaching and 
institutions continued to be controlled by the Kemalist government out of protecting the new 
secular republic from re-adopting the Islamic heritage of the Ottoman Empire. 
 
 In the 1950 free elections, Turkey shifted to a multi-party system. Due to its 
authoritarianism and specifically "harsh secularism", the ruling RPP was defeated by the 
Democratic Party (DP) (1950-1960). The DP was more tolerant of Islamic orientations. The 
party provided money "for the construction of mosques, permission was granted for the call to 
prayer to be said in Arabic, religious instruction in the public primary schools was introduced on 
an optional basis, and Sufi fraternal associations were allowed once more to function in public". 
In addition, the government allowed adults to take courses in Quran, which helped in increasing 
the rate of literacy especially in villages and rural areas (Borthwick 1980, 238). During this 
decade of DP rule and due to its loose policies towards Islam, Islamists created secret as well as 
open alliances with the government. Yet, the DP social and economic policies seemed to upset 
the officer corps. In May 27, 1960 "the Turkish armed forced, under the command of General 
Kemal Gursel, seized control of Istanbul and Ankara and arrested leading government 
officials"(Cleveland 2004, 280-1). The officer corps claimed that the purpose behind the coup 
was to "preserve the principles of Kemalism from which the DP government, in the opinion of 
                                                 
10 Imams who are responsible for making prayers and leading worshipers in mosques 
 74
the military, had strayed" (Cleveland 2004, 280-1). When the military felt Kemalism is secured. 
It returned power to civilians in 1961.   
 
The Islamists' political activities in Turkey began in the 1970s. In January 1970 
Necmettin Erbakan, who had been identified with Islamic political activism, established the 
National Order Party (NOP), the precursor of the three subsequent Islamist parties. With the 
NOP, the Islamists for the first time had an independent party institute through which they could 
promote their agenda in Turkish society. Erbakan's Islamist party aimed at taking over Turkish 
political institutions at first, then "transforming the Turkish society in to an authentic Islamic 
one" (Weitzman & Inbar 1997, 65). He intended to reach his goal through legal political activity 
from with the state system. In fact, Erbakan supported participating in democratic processes, 
especially legislative elections, "to which they were opposed in principle" (Weitzman & Inbar 
1997, 65). 
 
Weitzman and Inbar claim that in Turkey "Islamist movements came to realize that under 
present conditions the best way to gain power was by participating in open elections". In this 
sense, Islamists learned to "use the system they opposed" (Weitzman & Inbar 1997, 66). 
Nevertheless, accepting democracy was not included in Erbakan's party agenda until the 1980s 
though he participated in elections in the 1970s. In addition, Islamists did not approve the system 
of secular nation-state and called for the reestablishment of an Islamic state.   
       
Since the NOP's establishment, the same Islamist party changed names to escape being 
banned by secular authorities. First, it was called NOP (1970-1971) which was banned by the 
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Constitutional Court after military pressure on the bases that it violated the principles of 
secularism laid down in the Constitution. Second, it was named National Salvation Party NSP 
(1972-1981) that grew to become a regular member of government coalitions. In 1973, the NSP 
became "the third largest party in the country" and in 1974, "NSP leader Necmettin Erbakan 
became a deputy prime minister under RPP leader Bulent Ecevit". Moreover, in 1975 Erbakan 
was "appointed minister in Suleyman Demirel's coalition government". By being a minister, 
Erbakan's party gained access and freedom to affect the Turkish public especially in educational 
and communication issues. (Weitzman & Inbar 1997, 62) 
 
The NSP explicitly supported a religious political agenda calling for the restoration of the 
Islamic state and the reduction of economic ties to Christian countries of Western Europe. Due to 
this political agenda and to the increasing political influence of this party in the government, 
secularists considered the NSP a threat to the Kemalist ideology and to the Turkish culture and 
society. Therefore, NSP was banned after the military coup in 1980 (Weitzman & Inbar 1997, 
65). 
 
The NSP, like all other political parties on the Turkish scene, received a serious blow 
during the September 1980 military coup. The purpose of this coup was to end a long period of 
violence, which spread throughout the country, initiated by the coalition of extremist left wing 
and right-wing organizations due to the devastating economic conditions and repression. The 
coup was also intended to hold back the threat of Islamists embodied in the NSP. After the 
military take over, the National Security Council (NSC) ruled Turkey. The junta "carefully 
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revised the political parties' law and prepared a new constitution which severely limited political 
pluralism and freedom of expression" (Jenkins 2001, 39).  
 
  However, while the National Security Council NSC (ruled 1980-1983) succeeded in 
breaking up the extreme left and right. Yet, Islamist movement survived and even gained 
strength and importance during the 1980s. This was due to the new national curriculum that the 
NSC issued in an attempt to obstruct communism. This national curriculum made "the teaching 
of Islam compulsory in schools which, ironically and unconsciously, thus helped to fuel the rise 
in radical Islam" (Jenkins 2001, 39).  
 
After the military returned power to civilians, the NSP changed its name to the Welfare 
Party (1983-1998). Yet, "officer corps attitude towards Islamists was ambiguous" in the sense 
that "on the one hand they opposed Islamic radicalism and on the other promoted Islamic 
activities" (Weitzman & Inbar 1997, 68). However, this ambiguity soon became clear as a new 
strategy was adopted by the military based on an ideological concept the "Turkish-Islamic 
Synthesis". A group of right-wing intellectuals developed this approach. It represented an 
attempt to incorporate radical Islamists and the nationalists, Kemalists. The main idea was to 
contain the Islamist influence. Instead of constituting a threat to the government, Islamists will 
be integrated in the system to contribute to the territorial integrity of the Turkish nation-state and 
counter the revolutionary sentiments, especially among Kurdish youth. By adopting this strategy, 
the Islamists activities flourished, though under governmental supervision. They offered an 
attractive alternative for many Turks who were seeking salvation, even the ex-communists after 
the collapse of communism in the Soviet bloc (Weitzman & Inbar 1997, 68-9). 
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 By the early 1990s, it seemed that officer corps intervention in the Turkish political 
landscape ended. This tendency was due to the military "perception of the security environment" 
and not an abandonment of its role as the state and nation guardian (Jenkins 2001, 39).At the 
same time, Islamists continued being active in hope of reaching their goals. In 1991 elections, 
"Erbakan's Welfare Party won 16.7 per cent of the vote" and in 1993 it won "municipal elections 
in Istanbul and Ankara" (Weitzman & Inbar 1997, 66).  
 
Due to the growing electoral strength and political influence of Welfare Party through out 
the early 1990s, it finished first in December 1995 elections after wining 158 seats in the 
parliament (Swash 2002). Following a seven-month long period of political uncertainty and 
crisis, Erbakan managed to come to power through a coalition with the center-right True Path 
Party. It all began in September 1995, when the shaky two-year-old coalition between Prime 
Minister Tansu Çiller's (leader of the conservative True Path Party -TPP) and her junior partner, 
the social democratic Republican People's Party (RPP), collapsed. The result was a year earlier 
than scheduled parliamentary elections in December 1995.   
 
At that time, the popularity of the Welfare Party was alarming. Most opinion polls had 
put the Islamists in advance of the two leading center-right parties (True Path Party and the 
Motherland Party (MP) led by Mesut Yilmaz). The results of the election were expected. Welfare 
Party won 21.3 percent of the vote and 158 seats out of the 550-member of the National 
Assembly. His leader, Necmettin Erbakan, succeeded in forming coalition government with the 
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help of the centralist True Path Party that allowed him to become the country’s first Islamist 
prime minister of modern Turkey.  
 
This victory created shock waves both at home and abroad. At home, secular Turkish 
voters feared consequences of the coalition government in which Welfare Party became the 
senior partner. They feared that Erbakan would use this opportunity to boost the role of Islam in 
Turkish society and politics (Sakallioglu 2002, 195-9). On the international arena, concerns were 
strong about the Islamists' harsh criticisms of Turkey's close ties with the West, its membership 
in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and its efforts to join the EU.  
 
However, Necmettin Erbakan's victory did not last for long. After two years the powerful 
officer corps had, him forced out of office and banned his Welfare Party. In 1998, the Turkish 
Constitutional Court banned the Welfare Party after accusing it of being axis of activities 
opposing the principle of secularism. The Court also banned six of its leaders from political party 
activities for five years. The military justification was that the growing influence of Islamists in 
Turkish society became a threat to the state and Kemalism. A one general puts it: 
"The reactionary sector has been continuing its activities towards broadening 
its power of appeal in the society through 19 newspapers, 110 journals, 51 
radio and 20 televisions, over 1000 business corporations, 1200 student 
dormitories, over 800 private schools and courses. The figure of those 
attending officially registered Quran courses is 1,685,000 and this figure 
doubles every five years"(Sakallioglu 2002, 197)   
 
What made the Islamists activity threatening in the military viewpoint is that they 
contradicted the core principle of the modern Turkish republic. They challenged the Turkish 
Western identity, secularism, and separation of religion and state (Sakallioglu 2002, 189). 
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Finally, Islamists did not give up. The Welfare Party became the Virtue Party (1997- 
2001) that was also banned in on Friday 22 June 2001. On that day, "the Constitutional Court 
ruled the closure of the Fazilet (Virtue) party for being a ‘center of Islamic fundamentalism and a 
mere successor of the outlawed Welfare Party. It furthermore ordered the confiscation of the 
party’s assets, the toppling from the Turkish Grand National Assembly of two of its MPs and the 
banning of further three members from political activities for five years" (Euro-Mediterranean 
Human Rights Network, Press release 26.6.2001).  
  
In November 2002, Islamists once again sent a clear message to the secular generals of 
the army by giving the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) plain and decisive 
majority. AKP won almost two-thirds of the parliamentary seats (363 seats) with 34.2 percent of 
the vote (Aljazeera net 2002). The main parties that ran the country in the 1990s, the center-left 
Democratic Left Party (DSP) of outgoing Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, the Nationalist Action 
Party (MHP), and former President Turgut Özal’s centrist Motherland Party (ANAP) failed to 
pass the ten percent threshold needed to enter the parliament. Former Prime Minister Tansu 
Çiller’s center-right True Path Party (DYP) also failed in winning representation in the 
parliament. Therefore, the AKP’s victory declared it the first party in recent years to be able to 
govern without coalition partners (Aljazeera net 2002).  
 
The sweeping victory of Turkey’s AKP led to intense debate at home and abroad about 
the true nature of this untested Islamist political group. On the one hand, there is the claim that 
Erbakan is running the AKP, which emerged because of a split within Virtue Party, behind the 
scenes. In this sense, the AKP is perceived as the Trojan horse of political Islam in secular 
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Turkey (European press review 2002). On the other side, views that are more moderate believe 
that the AKP has no Islamic agenda and represents a new shift in Turkish politics (Dogan 2004). 
 
The AKP’s origins are Islamist just like the Welfare party, but unlike the Welfare, the 
political agenda they promoted during elections played down the Islamist tone. In their campaign, 
AKP leaders have emphasized predominantly social issues promising to lead Turkey out of a 
two-year economic depression and to end corruption in state structures. In addition, AKP leader 
adopted Turkey's ambition to join the European Union. The prospects for joining Europe help 
protect the AKP against possible military intervention to overthrow it, since that would be a fatal 
blow to the EU application. They also supported traditional ties with the United States and 
promised to cooperate with the International Monetary Fund. 
 
As opposed to Erbakan, who visited Libya, Iran, and other Muslim countries directly 
after his appointment as Prime Minister, AKP leaders perceive as their main concern cultivating 
relations with the Christian West (Dogan 2004 & Aljazeera net 2002). On the other hand, AKP 
avoided carefully any explicit indication to religion. Party leaders stressed repeatedly "they were 
the successors of liberal/conservative Democrat Party of the 1950s and Motherland Party of the 
1980s rather than Islamist Welfare Party (WP) and its successor Virtue Party". In addition, 
"readings of the party documents and official statements suggest that the AKP is determined to 
take a different approach in foreign affairs than the Islamist tradition from which the leaders 
have hailed". Nevertheless, many analysts claim that "AKP's moderate rhetoric is only a cover, 
and that the party is really not much different from RP- FP. They add that most of AKP's cadres, 
as well as Erdogan (AKP leader) himself, were trained within the RP-FP. Moreover, the increase 
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in AKP's popularity has paralleled a decline in the popularity of the other party with origins in 
RP-FP, the more extremist SP" (Aljazeera net 2002). 
 
The AKP has presented itself constantly as a new brand of Islamist parties. It claims that 
it is committed to the secularism of the Turkish state. At the same time, it opposes the exclusion 
of religious symbolism from public life, such as the ban on women wearing headscarves in state-
owned buildings (such as universities). It labels itself, as is Islamist in the same sense that 
Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe are Christian. From this perspective, the military, 
until now, is not interfering in politics. However, it is carefully watching the AKP. 
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The Armed Forces-FIS Confrontation in Algeria Elections 1991-1992  
 
Introduction 
After eight years of savage resistance against French colonial rule, Algeria won 
independence at the cost of nearly one million lives. The revolution, unfortunately, devoured its 
own members. Once the French colonialists left, Algeria's leaders turned on each other. The 
heroes of the revolution, like Ben Bella and Belkasim Krim, ended up poisoned, jailed, shot, 
strangled, or exiled by their brothers in arms (Willis 1996, 35-7). 
  
Algeria has been misruled, since independence in 1962, by juntas of army officers, under 
a disastrous system of state socialism. Algeria's oil and gas capital could not keep up with 
increasing population and it slipped into poverty. Faced with persistent high unemployment rates, 
no prospects of jobs, enormous government corruption, and vicious political repression, 
Algerians embraced newly formed moderate Islamist parties, notably the FIS that called for 
social justice, public morality, and an end to persistent French influence (Willis 1996). 
  
Algeria's discouraged military allowed the nation's first free elections in 1992. The FIS 
won a total victory. Push for by France, (which gives the military junta US $1 billion annually) 
the army generals canceled the elections and declared marshal laws. France did not want an 
Islamist government in Algeria. This caused a savage civil war to explode between Islamist 
resistances groups (some moderate, some radicals) and the government (Willis 1996).  
 Military-Islamists relations: from Incorporation to Opposition & Confrontation 
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The Algerian society is heavily influenced by its colonial heritage. When France seized 
Algeria in 1830, it imposed French language and culture on the ancient Islamic society. Algeria 
was considered an integral part of France in 1873; yet, "Muslim Algerians were not considered 
citizens". In 1918, Algerians were promised citizenship if they abandoned Islam and all its 
traditions, principles, laws, and adopted European discourse (Schulze 2000, 85). 
 
Islamist groups started their revolutionary activities in Algeria even before its 
independence. Islamists resistance movements were among many Algerian groups who carried 
out the fight against the French. This fight was done not only in the name of Algeria, but also of 
Islam. They were described as jihads (warriors) against infidel invaders. The French colonialists 
strengthened this conception of Islamic identity and fighting in the name of Islam. They did so 
by discrimination through distinguishing Algerians from the settlers, not by race, ethnicity, or 
nationality, but by religion (for the Algerians) and geo-ethnicity (for the settlers). Algerians were 
called ‘Muslims’ while French colonialists were called ‘Europeans’. Therefore, Islam became for 
most of the Algerian fighters the basic identity and the motive for liberation (Willis 1996, 1-33). 
 
In their fight for independence, the National Liberation Front (FLN) considered Islam as 
a deeply rooted social liberation feature in Algeria. They also perceived it as the uniting feature 
of Algerian struggle against colonial control and the "line drawn within society to differentiate 
French inhibitors from natives"(Schulze 2000, 162). The independent Algerian state, despite its 
strong socialist orientation, explicitly recognized Islam in the constitution as an essential element 
of state and society. 
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When colonial rule finally ended in 1962, a generation of Algerians who had been 
brought up, educated and trained as Frenchmen, came to power. Though they looked like Arabs 
and Muslims (which they were), they thought, spoke and acted French. Westernized elite were 
completely alienated from the Islamic masses. These `brown Frenchmen' acted as substitutes, or 
supervisors, for their former colonial rulers. In return, they were allowed to drain off the nation's 
wealth (Schulze 2000, 85-6).  
  
After independence, the FLN government led by Ahmed Ben Bella dominated Algeria. 
All the pre-existing parties and political orientations were forced to subordinate to the Front that 
organized the anti-colonial revolution. Ben Bella worked to "institutionalize a socialist centralism 
in Algerian by eliminating what remained of the Islamic institutions" (Schulze 2000, 169). In 
addition, Ben Bella wanted to limit the influence of military in the FLN and turn the party into a 
civilian national party. Yet, a military coup led by the Minister of Defense, Houari Boumedienne 
overthrew Ben Bella. Boumedienne ruled until his death in December 1978. The army obtained 
control over the FLN (Willis 1996, 38). 
 
The FLN supported by the new party hierarchy controlled political activism as well as 
Islamic trends. In fact, "the army coup of Boumedienne rehabilitated the Islamic public and 
provided it with clearly defined functions in the new state system" (Schulze 2000, 170). These 
defined functions meant the inclusion of Islamic orientations in the state-party apparatus as 
means for recruitment and propaganda. This was considered an important condition for the 
success of the FLN strategy of gaining political legitimacy. The FLN leadership recognized the 
importance of Islam "not just through its contribution to independence struggle but also through 
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its contribution to the construction of the independent Algerian state"(Willis 1996, 62).  In this 
context, ministry of religious affairs was established to supervise and regulate religious activities. 
Furthermore, to guarantee ideological agreement, Islamic scholars were turned into civil servants 
of the state in order to discourage any Islamic activity outside this ‘official framework’ (Schulze 
2000, 170-1).  
 
After the Boumedienne military coup, the state failed at the national level to consolidate 
its legitimacy specifically with the absence of democracy and the widespread of corruption. The 
Algerian authorities, starting from President Ahmad Benbella until President Hawwari 
Boumidyan, supported the ethnic political orientation, which helped in transforming the Islamist 
movements that supported the government to opposition and in creating new opposing Islamist 
groups. After Boumidyan death in December 1978, the FLN named Colonel Chadli Benjedid 
secretary general of the party and candidate for president in January 1979. On week later, he was 
elected the president in national election when 94 percent of FLN special congress voted for him. 
Boumedienne’s successor, Chadli Benjedid, was an army commander, which revealed the 
continuing strong influence of the military on Algerian politics through controlling the FLN 
(Willis 1996, 38). 
 After his election, Benjedid initiated a series of democratization processes and reforms 
concentrated mainly on structural changes and economic liberalization. The new regime also 
carried out an anticorruption campaign. This enhanced the legitimacy of the regime and enabled 
Benjedid to remove much of the opposition that was loyal to Boumedienne's legacy, thus 
strengthening his political control (Willis 1996, 69-105).  
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By the late 80s, Benjedid engaged in political liberalization and promoted free-market 
principles. He started by building a strong civil society in Algeria through legitimizing 
independent associations, and expanding the new 'freedom to organize' to the Algerian League of 
Human Rights that had constantly disapproved of the regime records of human rights especially 
its repression of public political activity and demonstrations (Willis 1996, 69-105). 
  
Unfortunately, democratization outcomes were completely the opposite then the 
originally intended. Algeria found itself in a critical position politically and economically in 
1988 as economic and political crisis erupted in the most violent and widespread public 
demonstrations since independence. The chaos and hostilities were protest against corrupt and 
incompetent government and questioned party conduct. They were the outcome of declining 
living standards, rapidly increasing unemployment, and frequent food shortages (Willis 1996, 
69-105).  
 
To face this boiling situation, Benjedid approved a number of reforms that were earlier 
proposed in national referendum, on November 3, 1988. He also announced plans for applying 
new amendments in the national constitution. The reforms included separation of party and state, 
free representation in local and national elections, and redefinition of the executive powers 
(Braheemy 2001, 172-204).  
 
The amended 1989 constitution encompassed democratic elements especially concerning 
political participation and civil society associations. It allowed for the creation and participation 
of competitive political associations, reinforced executive powers, and reduced the role of the 
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military in the political triangle. Following these reforms, the government issued a new 
legislation legalizing political parties and establishing a system of proportional representation in 
preparation for the country's first multiparty elections (Braheemy 2001, 172-204). 
 
Under these circumstances, the FIS was created in March 1989 by an elderly sheikh, 
Abbassi Madani who became the leader of the Front in Algeria and a charismatic young mosque 
preacher, Ali Belhadj. The FIS was legalized in September that year. It benefited from the 
discontent of younger, lower class Algerians and middle class traders who felt left out of the 
economy, in order to increase its popular base. Thus, the FIS soon became the largest and most 
active political opposition party in Algeria. They accomplished rapid success in local elections 
particularly in the working-class districts of Algiers and other cities (Willis 1996, 115-137).  
 
The FIS campaigned for an Islamic state in which society is governed by the Shari^a law 
and for an arabization of society. However, the slogan of building Islamic state on the ruins of 
the secular state remained vague and lacking comprehensive political and social agenda. The 
Islamist alternative to the existing regime was always articulated in ambiguous terms. This 
ambiguity attracted voters. The party avoided publishing a platform or issuing policy directives. 
Its economic program was also vague and limited to slogans claiming that solutions to the social 
crisis and wealth and prosperity will only come through Islam; Islam is the solution. In addition, 
the FIS acceptance of democratization was also vague and suspected. FIS leader Ali Belhadj 
confirmed this suspicion as he declared that when the FIS reach power there would be no more 
elections because God will be ruling (Willis 1996, 138-148). 
 
 88
FIS leaders did not reveal their first formal agenda in March 9, 1989. In this agenda, the 
FIS emphasized wealth redistribution and solutions to the economic crisis. However, their 
economic program remained unclear. The FIS has never published a detailed economic program 
(Willis 1996, 138). 
 
The vagueness in the FIS political agenda was due to the dual leadership (Abbassi 
Madani and Ali Belhadj) and the lack of a clear set of guidelines that the FIS needed as a 
political party. Abbassi Madani, a moderate Western-educated professor of comparative 
literature at the University of Algeria, represented a conservative orientation within the party 
based on using the democratic system to build the Islamic state and implement the FIS Islamist 
code. Supporters of this orientation included "small-business owners as well as wealthy 
merchants, civil servants as well as dissidents of the FLN"(Middle East Policy Council 1998 & 
Willis 1996, 147-8). 
Ali Belhadj, a high school teacher known for his militant preference and radical notions 
of the role of political Islam, represented an aggressive orientation in the FIS based on the 
immediate imposition of Islamic law even if it meant resorting to violence. Supporters of this 
orientation contained hopeless urbanized young, victims of unemployment, the socially 
marginalized, and generally the non-educated, who the FIS easily influenced and mobilized 
(Middle East Policy Council 1998 & Willis 1996, 147-8). 
 
Between Madani and Belhadj supporters, there was a third section constituted of 
"university professors, physicians and lawyers, either blocked in their social ascent by a system 
of nepotism or revolted by the degradation of morals blamed on cultural invasion". Those 
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professionals represented a nationalist orientation based on "the desire to establish an Islamic 
state expresses a nationalist quest for identity and responds to moral, cultural, and political 
exigencies. Their reasonable ambition is to become a full part of the establishment, not 
necessarily to overthrow it"(Middle East Policy 1998). 
 
Based on this, many members of the FIS had little in common. They were only united by 
the hope of building an Islamic state and overthrowing the secular ruling class. For this reason, 
the FIS was not able to articulate a clear and comprehensive political agenda. However, the more 
ambiguous there agenda is the more support they got from different social groups (Middle East 
Policy Council 1998 & Willis 1996, 147-8). 
 
Beginning with municipal elections in 1989, the FIS won control of over two-thirds of all 
local village, town, and city councils, including the capital of Algiers. In June 12, 1990, FIS won 
a clear victory to the ruling FLN in local elections, with 65% against 28 % (Willis 1996, 158-9). 
The government then tried to weaken the FIS by obstructing funds to the councils and changing 
the rules for the parliamentary elections, scheduled for June 1991. The FLN who still controlled 
the parliament, sought to modify the electoral boundaries to the advantage of its candidates. The 
principal challenger for the FLN, the Islamist FIS, believed that this would ruin their chances of 
victory. Their and respond came in by Belhadj's preaching that called for a general strike and 
organizing street demonstrations to protest the maneuverings of the FLN official. Abbassi 
Madani and Belhadj were arrested and imprisoned. Immediately after their arrests, the FIS won 
the first round of the legislative elections in December 26, 1991 seizing 188 seats out of 220 
(Willis 1996, 171-182).  
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In response, the army stepped in and annulled election results and canceled the electoral 
process. Although the military role in politics (after the constitutional amendments) was limited, 
"most of Algerians senior military figures that were largely trained abroad in secular states such 
as the Soviet Union and France were essentially hostile to the ideas of Islamism. This idea was 
seen as a threat to the foundations of the Algerian state as well as to their own positions, should it 
achieve political power" (Willis 1996, 183). In 1991, the military joined forces with the 
government to confront the FIS success in elections. 
 
Their justifications for canceling the legislative process were that the only way to protect 
democracy from an Islamist government is by terminating the democratic process and that there 
is a persisting "need to restore public order and reduce the power of the FIS" (Willis 1996, 185).  
 
The situation deteriorated rapidly after the cancellation of the elections. President Chadli 
resigned and a state of emergency was declared on 9 February 1992 that remains in force. The 
FIS was declared illegal in March 1992 and many of its leaders and members were arrested. 
Mohammed Boudiaf, a respected veteran of the 1954-62 war, was selected by the military to lead 
the new Council of State. Soon after he was selected, Boudiaf gave his orders to restrain the 
demonstrations and protests and to arrest those responsible. Under his commands, almost 10,000 
Islamist supporters were detained in huge camps in the desert. As a respond, Boudiaf was 
assassinated on public television. 
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 To sum up, Islam was more an identity to the Algerian people in the face of the French 
colonialists than a religion. This importance was recognized by the FLN, which was mainly 
controlled by the military since its members were among many who led armed resistance against 
the French. The FLN incorporated Islam in its regime as a mean to gain legitimacy. Yet, 
confrontations between the military and Islamists did not intensify until the Islamists opposed 
the state system and threatened the military interests. The FIS dramatic victory in the first round 
of elections meant only that an Islamist government would govern Algeria, if the FIS won the 
second round. In this sense, Military-Islamists relations turned to be violent as the military 
arrested and imprisoned the FIS leadership, cancelled elections and banned the FIS. The FIS 













Military-Islamists Relations: Challenges & Prospects  
Findings 
The secular rulers' attempts to eliminate Islam from Turkish society failed. Kemalism 
could not abolish the Ottoman Empire heritage. For many, Islamism was the only way to 
preserve Islam in Turkish society. Islamists, even the moderate and non-violent, suffered from 
continuous repression, which spread through secular institutions, such as the military and the 
Supreme Court. 
 
The generally inefficient governance and widespread corruption that characterized most 
civilian governments in Turkey enhanced the military role as the regime guardian. In addition, it 
gave the military more liberty in intervening in politics especially to prevent Islamists from 
reaching or keeping power. It also affected the public opinion, as Turks trusted the armed forces 
more than they trusted the politicians they democratically elected.  
 
In 2002, Turks viewed all of the old governing parties as incompetent. The AKP was the 
only party to avoid Turkish people contempt. This party was newly established and has never 
been part of the government; hence, it was not blamed for governmental corruption. In this sense, 
people chose the AKP to be their new ruler even with its Islamist roots.  
 
Many factors collaborated to support AKP's dramatic success in 2002 elections; yet, the 
most important reason that helped the AKP gather votes from the secularists as well as Islamists 
is the change its political speech and strategies presented. Since its establishment in 2001, the 
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AKP leaders aggressively promoted it as a conservative or even liberal- conservative party rather 
than an Islamist one. In accordance with this position, AKP has spread moderate messages to the 
public through out 2001 and 2002. Unlike Welfare Party and Virtue Party, AKP avoided 
challenging and clashing with the military. It avoided threatening secularism, nation-state, and 
existing political order or even implying that it will do so in the future. 
 
The new strategies applied by the AKP leadership in their campaign helped it attract 
defectors from many secular parties as well as votes from different social groups ranging from 
Istanbul’s middle class to Inner Anatolia’s rural nationalists. In addition, considerable number of 
Welfare Party’s former supporters has backed up the AKP as well.  
 
In the Algerian case, as with Islamists elsewhere, the whole emphasis of FIS was on 
achieving political power on the ruins of secular state system. The conflict between secular rulers 
(FLN) backed by the military and Islamism put the armed forces in direct confrontations with 
Islamists. These confrontations reflected deep cultural segregation. Algerian people have a 
profound affection toward Islam. In fact, Islam has always been associated with patriotism in 
Algeria. This feeling was strengthened during the French colonization between 1830 and 1962.  
The Algerian regime tried, between 1962 and 1988, to follow the path of the French colonialists 
by exploiting the name of Islam to promote secular views and measures. This was the time when 
many clashes took place between the pro-Islamic and the pro-secular waves, especially between 
military and Islamists. 
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Officer corps claimed that they were the ones to liberate Algeria. They are the heroes of 
the progressive act in Algeria. They recognized the pro-Islamic as the people of shadow. This 
meant in their standard; the enemies of modernized culture and education. Many in the younger 
generations found themselves alienated from these notions. Islamists found fertile recruiting 
grounds among Algeria’s disproportionately young population. The worn-out, anti-colonial 
themes used by the regime to legitimate its authority no longer resonate with the people.  
 
Another important factor that helped the FIS win the first round of elections is 
authoritarianism that suppressed civil society associations and corruption. Algeria suffered under 
a legacy of years of mismanagement and strict authoritarian control by the army and the FLN 
that had ruled the country since independence in 1962 and held onto power through force. The 
military backed FLN government banned opposition parties, suppressed the press, and smothered 
independent trade unions, youth organizations, Islamists activities, and agriculture collectives. 
The inevitable result was riot and violence that erupted across the country in 1988.  
 
However, the FIS centered its agenda, during the 1991-1992 elections, on the strict 
respect of Islamist ambitions. This meant that an Islamic state must be established and legislation 
has to be compatible with the principles of the Shari^a in all fields. The concept of democracy is 
associated with atheism.  
 
Before the first round of the December 1991 parliamentary elections, one of the FIS 
leaders, Ali Belhadj, spoke of banning secular and socialist parties if there was FIS majority. The 
FIS was demanding a restoration of the original form of Islam, based on Quran and Sunna, 
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which they considered had been corrupted by the Algerian repressive military backed 
government, and abandoned by the majority of the population. In addition, the FIS condemned 
democracy while participating in the electoral process. Therefore, the FIS political agenda did 
not represent any change in their political ideology. FIS only used democracy and free elections 
as means to win seats in the parliament in order to implement its Islamist agenda. 
 
The FIS was considered as a response to the deep felt resentment of the population 
towards an incompetent and unjust government. From this perspective, the Islamists agenda was 
seen as hope for change by the oppressed in Algeria and an extreme threat by the military. 
Change was something the majority of people longed for and Islamist political parties sought to 
achieve. Yet, change to an Islamist government was not what the armed forces and secular elite 
looked forward. Thus, they interfered in elections and prevented the FIS from reaching power. 
 
By examining the two case studies, certain key parallels and differences could be found 
between the two cases. Both Turkey and Algeria suffered from on-going clashes between 
secularization/modernization and Islam/Islamists. In other words, between the military as a 
guardian of nation-state, modernization and secularism on the one hand and Islamists on the 
other. The power of Islamists movements (AKP, FIS) has grown after the military, which feared 
the establishment of an Islamic state and the collapse of the secular system, suppressed Islamists. 
Thus, deep conflict between armed forces and the forces of Islamism became part of the pre-
colonization political landscape. Both countries, as many other countries in MENA, after 
winning independence and establishing a state, stood at the threshold of East and West, of 
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religious and secular nationalism. Mostly, the Islamist ideology constituted a challenge to the 
modernization project; thus, to the military which was a modernizing force.  
 
 Corrupted and weak civil governments enhanced confrontations between armed 
forces and Islamists. What happened in Algeria before 1991-1992 elections and in Turkey before 
2002 elections was firstly the consequence of misguided long-term corrupted governance, which 
undermined the efficiency of the state apparatus. Governments in both countries were unable to 
perform routine economic and administrative functions.  
 
However, Islamists in Turkey differed from those in Algeria in their political agenda and 
strategy. In Turkey, the AKP, a reformist Islamist group, accepted democracy, the existing 
political order, secularism, and nation-state. The AKP even declared that the party does not pose 
any threat to the secular state and it dose not have any intentions to change the existing political 
system or to apply an Islamic constitution and establish an Islamic State. The party emphasized 
economic development and European Union membership, which were not Islamist's hot issues 
but rather military hot issues. 
  
Contrary to the AKP, the FIS were strict in their agenda. They wanted to implement 
Islamic law, establish an Islamic state, and fight secularism, modernism, and the Western 
influence in Algeria, in particular the French influence. Furthermore, the FIS criticized Western 
values (democracy) while participating in elections. They were only using democratic values as a 
mean to reach an end.  
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From this perspective, the AKP was able to win significant majority in 2002 elections, 
form a government headed by the AKP leader, and stay in power until the present day without 
military interference. On the other hand, although the FIS was able to win a great majority in the 
first round of 1991-1992 elections, its agenda was considered a threat to military and state 
system. Thus, military annulled election results, canceled the legislative process, and banned the 




This paper examined both the theoretical bases of civil-military relations and an analysis 
of these relations in the MENA region. Samuel Huntington proposed a theoretical framework to 
examine civil-military relations based on developing a theory of military professionalism. He 
starts by defining the aspects of this relation in the context of national security policy. He also 
specifies the characteristics of a professional officer corps and its role in state, society, and in a 
democratic system. He concludes that the officer corps must be subordinate to civil authorities 
and that the political and military affairs of a state must be completely separate.  
 
However, Huntington formulated this theoretical framework based on the study of the 
history and culture of western societies and specifically on the history of the United States armed 
forces. Civil-military relations in the MENA region are quite different. Military professionalism 
did not make the military apolitical and neutral as Huntington predicted. The more the armed 
forces were professionals the further they interfered in politics. In this regards, the very nature of 
professionalism, that Huntington characterized by expertness, social responsibility, and 
corporateness, often leads to military clashes with civilian authorities. Consequently, the military 
becomes politicized (Finer 1962, 22-27).  
 
Due to its professionalism, then, military in the MENA region was "the one institution 
that had the cohesiveness and tools to take power" (Rubin 2002, 10). The Military became the 
guardian of the modern state system and the existing political regime as well as the force of 
spreading and protecting secularism and modernization in society. 
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The rise of Islamism came as a response to religious, cultural, and social crises. Islamists 
resisted the secularization policies of their governments, and advocated the restoration of pure 
form of Islamic state and laws. They condemned their ruling elites as deviants from the pure path 
of Islam, and criticized modernization attempts as imitation of Western imperialism. Islamists 
even believed that such modernization attempts constituted the basis of moral, social, and 
religious decay of Muslim communities. Islamism represented a serious political threat to secular 
regimes and modern state system by a combination of their propaganda and violent actions. In 
most of the MENA countries armed forces launched aggressive campaigns to crash Islamist 
groups and prevent them from reaching power and implementing their goals. In this sense, 
military-Islamists relations were mostly violent. 
 
This paper tried to find out the conditions under which non-violent relations could be 
established between the military and Islamist that will allow the latter to reach and stay in power 
without fearing military intervention. 
The assumption examined was that they could reach power by making some sacrifices 
concerning their Islamist orientation. Islamist must also compromise if they want to stay in 
power. Having introduced the relevant theoretical background and case studies with the analyses 
of cases findings, certain conclusions can be drawn. 
 
 It is hard to establish a valid causal relation between military repression and Islamists 
persisting attempts to reach power. However, a kind of non-violent relation between Islamists 
and military could be established on the bases that Islamists played down their ideological roots. 
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Islamists radical views and attitudes towards nation-states, secularism, modernity, and 
democracy constituted the main factors that affected military-Islamist relations.  
 
Islamists who adopted a revolutionary doctrine that tended to view modern state system, 
secularism and democracy as a modern agenda by which the West hopes to establish its 
hegemony over the Muslim world  provoked military antagonism and were not able to reach or 
hold on to power. Whereas, Islamist groups who were able to adjust their political ideology in 
accordance with the current tendencies in the modern state, such acknowledging the domination 
and the widespread of the Western values and accepting, not fighting these values were able to 
establish non-violent relations with the military. They were also able to hold on to power.  
 
These groups tended to be more receptive to new ideas, practices, and institutions. They 
stress the need for continuity of basic Islamic traditions but believe that Islamic law (Shari^a) is 
historically conditioned and needs to be reinterpreted in light of the changing needs of modern 
society. Such Islamists groups, although obtained power based on their Islamic origins, did not 
frame themselves as religion-based parties. This shift in their ideology and strategy allowed them 
to reach and stay in power.  
 
This paper finding showed there is a certain price Islamists must pay in order to reach 
power without fearing overthrown by the armed forces. The price is to give up their ambition in 
creating an Islamic state and applying the Islamic laws. In addition, they must give up hostilities 
against Western principles, especially democracy modernity and secularism because these values 
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are protected by the military. Threatening them will only lead to military interventions and 
confrontations. 
 
  Therefore, this research concludes that Islamist groups are more likely to establish non-
violent relations with the military that could help them reach power by playing down their 
Islamist roots. Most importantly, they can achieve this goal by giving up their ambition is 
creating an Islamic state and applying the Islamic law and by accepting the values and ideologies 
that the military is protecting, specifically democracy and modernization. They need to accept 
these principles and do not attempt to work against it or to destroy the state system once they 




In the last decade, many Islamists movements changed their policies towards the secular 
state and laws. They embraced some democratic principles, especially free elections, as few 
countries in the MENA witnessed limited extent of democratic transition. 
 
 In the countries that have experienced some degree of sustained political opening in 
recent years, namely, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Turkey, and Morocco, even in ‘blocked’ cases 
such as those of Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia, many Islamists tried to interact politically and 
peacefully with governments. This led many to realize that repression provided fertile ground for 
militant Islamists' activities. The solution then is to democratize MENA countries.  
 
This paper proved that Islamists, who played down their Islamist roots and embraced 
democratic values, were able to reach power and stay in power. Yet, questions become, if 
Islamists are willing to compromise what could MENA governments offer them in return? How 
are governments going to contain the Islamist problem? 
The recommended points to be further investigated by future research: first, it is important to 
examine the political options through which MENA governments could integrate Islamists in the 
political system and eliminate their threat. Many countries in the MENA tend to resolve the 
Islamists problem through politics rather than violence especially that international powers' 
attention is focused on the region. Thus, allowing Islamists to represent their own kind, like any 
other party, in the parliament might be considered an essential political option.  
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Another point is to find out if there are any guarantees, other than the military, that the 
relationship between governments and Islamists will remain peaceful. There is always the 
possibility that governments might turn against Islamists and once again implement repressive 
policies. On the other hand, Islamists might use their position in the parliament or government to 
induce radical views or even threaten the secular state.  Thus, it is important to find out if there 
are any democratic guarantees that governments and Islamists will not turn against each other in 
the end.   
 
In today's world, the Islamist issue is one of the most important global problems. The 
international society is faced with the challenge of fighting violence and terrorism, most of 
which are related to Islamist groups. Hence, it is necessary to study the prospects and ways of 
dealing with the Islamist issue. 
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